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PREFACE
If there are any persistent problems of philosophy 
and I think it would have to be agreed that there are, then, 
the problem of deciding whether or not man has free-will 
must be one of them. Indeed, in the history of philosophy 
so many attempts have been made to show either that he has 
or that he has not got a free-will that one can easily 
enough understand the reluctance of some philosophers to 
deal with the problem at all. In spite of this, however, I 
intend to make one more contribution towards resolving this 
ancient and honorable problem. More specifically, I plan 
to defend the position that man does have free-will; and I 
interpret this plan in such a way that it commits me to 
defending the non-causal freedom of intentions and the 
decisions from which they often emerge. On the other hand,
I shall be willing to agree that the relationship between an 
intention and an action is a causal one. But since I con­
sider the essential element in any defence of the non-causal 
freedom of intentional action to be demonstration of the 
uncaused nature of the decision and the corresponding inten­
tion that lie behind the action, my task can equally well be 
interpreted as that of defending the non-causal freedom of
intentional action. And that is the principal way in which 
I shall interpret it.
It must not be forgotten, however, that the attempt 
to establish man’s free-will has seldom been interpreted 
purely as an exercise in the subtleties of philosophical 
dialectic. On the contrary, the practical bearing of the 
problem is, as far as we are concerned, only too obvious; for, 
we shall argue, if the agent's actions are causally determined, 
it becomes impossible to make sense out of his consciousness 
of moral obligation. But this would entail the impossibility 
of making sense out of the notion of the agent as a respon­
sible person which in our view is the basic use of the notion 
of responsibility. We shall, therefore, with the practical 
bearing of our problem still in mind, begin by expatiating 
on the notion of responsibility with special emphasis on 
what we take to be the basic use of the notion. And from 
there we shall argue back to our interpretation of the non- 
causal freedom of intentional action that renders this basic 
use of the notion of responsibility coherent.
Incidentally, it will be noted that if we argue in 
this way the title of this essay will not be entirely appro­
priate. More specifically we should have entitled it The 
Concept of Responsibility and the Freedom of Intentional 
Action if the title was to reflect the order of the argument. 
The purely administrative problems that such a change of
 ^ title would have involved^ however, were sufficient to render 
it practically impossible. Thus, bureaucracy triumphs once 
more over dialectic. Unfortunately, as a modern day St.
Paul might put it, the former provides no surer guarantee of 
salvation then the latter.
I
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Chapter 1 
RESPONSIBILITY
It Is no doubt familiar enough ground that there are 
at least three fairly distinct although interconnected 
strains of use of ’’responsible”: what may be called the 
disposition-describing use as in "President Kennedy was a 
responsible person" where this rather ambiguous expression 
is to be contrasted both with "irresponsible person" and 
"non-responsible person"; in other words it is to be inter­
preted both as an evaluative description of the agent and as 
a non-evaluative description of the agent; secondly, there 
is the job-assigning or job-designating use, as in, "You'll 
be responsible for locking the door each night at 11.00 
o'clock"; thirdly, there is the responsibility-attributing 
use as in "Smith was responsible for the death of Jones" or 
"Lord Reith was responsible for the growth of British broad­
casting". "Responsible to" construction should perhaps also 
be mentioned: "You will be responsible to (ie. take orders 
from and report to) the Minister of Defence." They resemble 
the job-assigning strain since both involve the performance 
of tasks, but in one the task is specified while in the 
other it is often left to be determined.
Despite the variety of uses or strains of use of
"responsible" there does seem to be one that is basic in the 
sense that its applicability is a necessary condition of the 
applicability of the others. This one is the disposition- 
describing use. A world in which we never had occasion to 
describe anyone as a responsible person would, if we could 
imagine such a thing, and this is doubtful, be a world in 
which everyone was completely irresponsible* or more radical 
still but more easily imaginable and, therefore, more to the 
point it would be a world in which,like the Hobbesian state 
of nature, the inhabitants were neither responsible nor 
irresponsible because none of the moral categories applied. 
And, needless to say, moral categories have to apply if we 
are to make sense out of the use of "responsible" in question; 
for the notion of a responsible person is incomprehensible 
apart from the notion of obligation. Since, moreover, this 
latter notion, to be fully elucidated, would require most of 
the moral categories at our disposal, this amounts to saying 
that the disposition-describing use of "responsible" must In 
the same way be seen against the whole battery of moral 
distinctions that we habitually make.
In what sense is the disposition-describing use of 
"responsible" basic? In trying to answer this question let 
us take the job-assigning or job-designating use of "responsible"
first. In the kind of imaginary world we mentioned where 
the inhabitants were neither responsible nor irresponsible, 
we should not likely make an inhabitant of it responsible 
for carrying out any task; at best we might try to convince 
him that carrying it out corresponded with his own interest 
or could be made to correspond with it and thus provide him 
with an incentive. But there would be no point in appealing 
to him as a responsible man because ex hypothesi he would 
not be one; and, therefore, there would be no point in 
asking him to regard his task as a responsibility or an 
obligation. Nor is anything changed by the fact that we 
might still say to him, "You will be responsible for doing X 
— if you don't I'll punish you." For, here, his carrying 
out X is being made to correspond to his own interests and 
his being made responsible for carrying it out reduces to 
"Do X or else." In other words, the notion of a respon­
sibility is really quite superfluous here and can only be 
regarded as a hold-over from those cases where a person is 
made responsible for carrying out some task because he is at 
least believed to be a responsible person. And, needless to 
say, in those cases the assignation or designation of a job 
can never be reduced to an imperative-cum-threat at the 
expense of the notion of a responsibility.
Incidentally, this latter fact should serve as a 
warning to anyone who would try to assimilate the job- 
assigning or job-designating use of "responsible" to its
responsibility-attributing use. For, if one is going to 
argue that the assignation or designation of responsibility 
means only that the agent will be held responsible for what 
he does or fails to do and will be punished or rewarded 
accordingly, then, it remains unexplained what it means to 
assign or designate a task as a responsibility as opposed to 
assigning or designating a task tout court. And this is 
hardly a satisfactory state of affairs.
None of this, I fully realise, adds up to a definite 
statement of what it is to assign or designate a task as a 
responsibility, I am not at all convinced, however, that it 
is necessary for us to provide one so long as it is recog­
nized that there is the distinction to be drawn between 
assigning or designating a task as a responsibility and 
assigning or designating a task tout court. On the other 
hand, it seems undeniable that the kind of statement we have 
in mind would have to provide at some point for the agent's 
ability to sacrifice his own interests to his sense of moral 
obligation, as we have insisted all along.
But what if the agent had an obligation to look after 
his own interests? In that case it would be possible to con­
sider the person who always had his own interests uniquely 
in mind to be a responsible person and to assign responsi­
bility to him accordingly. And it would make no difference 
that he carried out his resulting obligations simply because
8his doing so was in his own interest, I do not think, how­
ever, that the agent has any kind of obligation to look 
after his own interests. Or, at least, he has no such obli­
gation where only he himself is involved; for he can, of 
course, have such an obligation where someone else’s inter­
ests depend upon his looking after his own. Here, however, 
he would be a responsible person not simply because he 
looked after his own interests but because he looked after 
them as a means of looking after someone else's interests.
In other words, to draw a distinction already drawn by one 
philosopher a person can have an obligation with respect to 
himself in the sense that his interests would be involved 
in a full description of how the particular obligation came 
into being but this does not constitute an obligation ^  
himself,^ Admittedly, we do speak of the agent's owing 
something to himself. For example, we say that Smith owes 
it to himself to take a vacation. But a moment's reflection 
makes it clear that we are not referring by this turn of 
phrase to any obligation that the agent owes to himself. On 
the contrary, it is just another way of saying that it is in 
Smith's interest to take a vacation; or, to put it in a 
slightly different form, it is just another way of saying 
that, if prudential considerations are to take priority,
1, Mavrodes, George I,, "Duties to Oneself", Analysis, vol, 24, N,S, no, 101, 1964, pp,165-67.
then. Smith ought to take a vacation.
This way of interpreting the turn of phrase in ques­
tion is, I should have thought, the obvious one. But it is 
not obvious to at least one philosopher, Mr. N. Potion. He 
maintains that the agent can have an obligation to take a 
vacation even when only his own interests are involved. And 
against those like Professor Kurt Baier who differ with him 
on the grounds that such an agent cannot complain if he does 
not finally take a vacation nor boast of a clear conscience 
if he does Potion affirms that he can do both. Or, at least 
this is what Potion seems to think that he is affirming in 
posing the following two rhetorical questions: "Why cannot I 
complain to myself and to others if I find myself too weak 
to carry out my resolve to take a vacation? And why cannot
I boast to myself and to others of a clear conscience once I
2finally overcome my weakness and take my vacation? But^  
surely, this is beside the point. No one would want to hold 
that the agent cannot complain and boast in the circumstances 
described in these questions. This is explained by the fact 
they introduce a new element, namely^ the weakness of the 
agent. Now, the agent can complain when he succumbs to his 
weakness and boast when he overcomes it only because such a 
weakness ultimately poses a threat to the interests of others,
2, Potion, N,, "Can We Have Moral Obligations to Ourselves", Australian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 43, 1965, pp.27-27.
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And as such he has an obligation to try to resist it even 
when in the actual circumstances no one’s interests excepting 
his own are threatened by it. For by trying to resist it even 
when no other person's interests are threatened by it he puts 
himself in a better position to resist it when they are.
There is, however, despite all that I have said, a 
metaphysical model of the self in terms of which it could 
make good sense to say that the agent had an obligation to 
look after his own interests, I have in mind that model 
wherein the self is divided, so to speak, into a higher and 
a lower self. Now, in terms of such a model it could be 
argued that the lower self has an obligation to acceed to 
the moral interests of the higher self. Nor do I think that 
our use of the phrase "moral interests" in this context 
should give any cause for alarm. For on the model in ques­
tion there would, as far as the higher self was concerned, 
be no significant distinction to be made between obligation 
and interest. On the contrary, the two by the very nature of 
the case would coincide; and it would only be with reference 
to the interests of the lower self that a distinction between 
the two could be significantly made. It is not, however, my 
Intention to go into elaborate detail on this model of the 
self. Instead, I should like to make it clear to what extent 
the agent's obligation to look after his own interests on 
such a model depends upon regarding him as two persons in one.
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And this betrays the extent to which the obligation to look 
after these interests even on this model is parasitic upon 
and merely an extension of the obligation we have to look 
after the interests of others. In other words, we cannot 
even entertain the possibility of having an obligation to 
look after our ovm interests unless we first assume that we 
have such an obligation with respect to the interests of 
others. And even then unless we accept a certain metaphysi­
cal model of the self the possibility seems to be a very 
dubious one.
If, then, it is agreed that a responsible person can­
not be one who has only his own interests in mind and if it 
is further agreed that the latter kind of person would not 
be given tasks to carry out as responsibilities, we seem to 
have shown that the applicability of the disposition- 
describing use of "responsible" is a necessary condition of 
the applicability of the job-assigning or job-designating use 
of the same term. Before going on, however, I think it 
should be noted that to assign or designate a task as a re­
sponsibility to an agent whom one knew to have only his own 
interest in mind would not be a formal contradiction but what 
might be called a pragmatic or performative contradiction. 
That is to say, as an exercise it would be self-defeating and 
absurd in roughly the same way as my telling you that I am 
dead would be self-defeating and absurd; for just as in the
12
latter case I should nullify what I said by the mere act of 
saying it, so, in the former case one would deny what one 
knows to be true, namely, that the other person is not respon­
sible by the mere act of assigning or designating a task as 
a responsibility.
It must not be forgotten that we wanted to show that 
the disposition-describing use of "responsible" is more basic 
than the Job-assigning or Job-designating use. And it might 
be argued that showing the applicability of the former to be 
a necessary condition of the applicability of the latter is 
not enough to show this. Or, at least, it is not enough 
unless the converse is not also true. And thus our task, 
clearly, is to show that it is not true. Now, I think this 
line of argument is substantially correct. But if it is 
correct we must ask ourselves whether we could imagine a 
world where no one was ever made responsible for carrying 
out any task and yet where it still made sense to call an 
agent a responsible person. The answer would seem to be, 
yes. A negative reply would be appropriate only if we 
thought of all our responsibilities as tasks that were 
assigned or designated to us; and there does not seem to be 
any good reason why we should think this. On the contrary, 
such a view would commit us to an excessively legalistic
13
interpretation of our responsibilities and resulting obli­
gations. As a result, we should fail to appreciate the 
extent to which a truly responsible agent can, as it were, 
give the law unto himself. But to insist on the autonomy of 
the responsible agent in this way really amounts to saying 
that the carrying out of assigned or designated responsibil­
ities is really only a part of what it is to be such an 
agent. Indeed, it is to say that we could imagine a world 
in which it was no part at all.
Once again on that metaphysical model of the self of 
which we spoke earlier it might be argued that all our 
responsibilities are assigned or delegated to us by our 
higher self. What we have already said on this subject, 
however, can with the obvious modifications required be seen 
to apply equally well here. But what of that theological 
interpretation of responsibilities and obligations wherein 
they are all made to depend upon God as their assignor or 
designator? It would seem to be simply from a phenomen­
ological point of view false; and it would certainly seem to 
be from a logical point of view indefensible. In fact, its 
logical indefensibility seems to depend upon its phenomen­
ological falsity. For, if it is true, and its truth would 
seem to be undeniable, that we are aware of obligations that 
do not have God or anyone else as their assignor or designator, 
then we must admit that something can be an obligation
14
Independently of its being assigned or designated by God.
But If this is the case, then we can truly regard the obli­
gation or duty as something Intrinsically binding on us.
This, however, seems counter to the whole spirit of the 
theological view with which we are dealing; for, according 
to this view, our duties and obligations are *suoh only 
because God assigns them or designates them to us. Thus, as 
one philosopher put it in a slightly different context where 
he talks of making instead of assigning or designating, "We 
find ourselves baffled by the collision between the suggestion 
of contingency Involved in the concept of 'making* and the 
seemingly Intrinsic authority of the specific obligation to 
be thus 'made' In fact, in the final analysis, a theo­
logical interpretation of obligation is really only another 
example of the excessive legalism of which we spoke earlier; 
for it matters not who is supposedly assigning or designating 
the responsibilities, the autonomy essential to the notion of 
a responsible agent is in any case compromised.
What of the responsibility-attributing use of "respon­
sible"? Is it equally true here that the applicability of 
the disposition-describing use of "responsible" is a neces­
sary condition of its applicability and that the converse
3. Maclagan, W.G., The Theological Frontier of Ethics, p.67.
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does not hold? I think that we can answer in the affirmative 
to both of these questions or, what amounts to the same thing, 
to both parts of the question. To take the first part first. 
In a world in which the Inhabitants were neither responsible 
nor irresponsible there would be no point in attributing 
responsibility to anyone for any deed. In order to defend 
this assertion I think it should be made clear from the 
beginning that there seems to be no purely causal use of 
"responsible"; and I take this to mean that there is no use 
of "responsible" in which responsibility can be attributed 
to the agent, all considerations of obligation aside, merely 
because he initiated some action. This is not to say, of 
course, that we do not speak of inanimate objects being 
responsible for having brought some state of affairs into 
being. But in such a case we are by extension treating the 
inanimate object as a kind of moral agent to whom respon­
sibility for his deeds or misdeeds can be attributed; and 
that requires the notion of an obligation that he can fulfil 
or fail to fulfil. Now, the fact that there is no purely 
causal use of "responsible" is an important one; for, if 
there were a purely causal kind of attributive responsi­
bility, we could, so long as they initiated actions, 
attribute responsibility for what they did to the totally 
amoral agents in our imaginary world.
Even if there is no purely causal kind of attributive
16
responsibility we have not, of course, simply in virtue of ■ 
that fact proved the truth of the assertion that the appli­
cability of the disposition-describing use of "responsible" 
is a necessary condition of the applicability of the respon­
sibility-attributing use. I do not think, however, that in 
the absence of a purely causal kind of attributive respon­
sibility independent of all considerations of obligation any­
one could plausibly dispute the irrelevance of attributing 
responsibility in an amoral world where no one was respon­
sible or irresponsible. This is not to say, of course, that 
in such a world reward and punishment would necessarily be 
irrelevant. But all this shows is that there is more to 
attributing responsibility than rewarding or punishing. 
Indeed, if there were not, it would be hard to see how the 
latter pair of activities could be morally Justified; for 
the agent is rewarded and punished for those things for 
which responsibility has been previously attributed to him. 
And a necessary condition of, in turn, morally Justifying 
such an attribution is that he should be able to distinguish 
in some way between right and wrong.
In the face of all this one might, I suppose, suggest 
that we ignore the question of moral Justification and go on 
to attribute responsibility and reward and punish people 
accordingly in our amoral world. But this, it seems to me, 
is a desperate expedient that could be rendered plausible
17
only If we did not have the concept of responsibility that 
we actually do have. It is, however, with the concept of 
responsibility that we actually do have that I am principally 
concerned.
Once again this is not to say that a formal contra­
diction can be got out of saying, "Smith is neither a respon­
sible nor an irresponsible agent and he is responsible for 
the death of Jones", It would, however, be a pragmatic or 
performative contradiction; and anyone who was sincerely 
trying to convince us that Smith should be held responsible 
for the death of Jones would defeat his own ends by saying 
such a thing. Incidentally, that a formal contradiction can­
not be got out of uttering the sentence in question brings 
us back to our original contention that, although the various 
strains of use of "responsible" are interconnected they are 
in a significant sense distinct.
Once again we must show that if the applicability of 
the disposition-describing use of "responsible" is a neces­
sary condition of the applicability of the responsibility- 
attributing use the converse is not true. Otherwise, we 
shall not have shown that the former is any more basic than 
the latter. How is this to be shown? First of all, let us 
Imagine a world the inhabitants of which were responsible in
18
the disposition-describing sense and yet were never respon­
sible in the responsibility-attributing sense. An example 
of such a world would be one where everyone tried to act in 
accordance with his obligations but where, because of 
empirical obstacles in his way, he did not succeed in doing 
what he tried to do. And this does not come about because 
the agent cannot be considered responsible for what he tried 
to do; for obviously he can and one has only to think of the 
number of people thought to be responsible in a praiseworthy 
sense for trying to save the lives of their friends or the 
number of people held responsible for attempted murder to be 
convinced of this fact. It remains true, hov/ever, that in a 
world where everyone systematically tried and failed to act 
in accordance with his obligations the motivation for trying 
would be transformed into something different eventually, 
namely, a disposition to be so motivated if things were rele­
vantly different; and yet even here we could speak of a 
responsible agent as one who would, if the empirical circum­
stances were significantly altered, be motivated to try to f 
fulfil his obligations or simply go ahead and fulfil them. 
Thus, to take one of our examples. Lord Reith, even if he 
could not succeed in being responsible for anything in our 
imaginary world, let alone anything so laudable as the growth 
of the B.B.C., could still be considered a responsible person.
It might be argued against this that Lord Reith in
19
the circumstances described could at best be considered a 
potentially responsible person and not a responsible person 
tout court. But the trouble with this is that everyone can 
in a trivial sense be considered a potentially responsible 
person: there is always some possible world in which even 
the person in our imaginary world who lacks the disposition 
to be motivated to try to fulfil his obligations or simply
to go ahead and fulfil them would be so disposed. As a
result, if we were to call Lord Reith in the circumstances 
described a potentially responsible person we should have to 
distinguish this sense^"potentially responsible person" from 
that in which everyone is a potentially responsible person.
In view of this it would seem much less likely to mislead 
and, therefore, more appropriate if we called Lord Reith a 
responsible person tout court in the circumstances described.
Another argument that has to be considered is to the
effect that in our imaginary world the inhabitants would not 
know what the phrase "responsible person" meant. For in 
order to know this, they would have to know what "action" 
meant since the notion of a responsible person is tied to 
the notion of an obligation to do certain things, but they 
cannot know what "action" means because they do not perform 
actions. Nov/, it should be noted right from the start that 
the most this argument could prove is that the inhabitants 
of our imaginary world did not describe one another as respon*
20
slble persons. It could not prove that v;e, as outsiders, ere 
prohibited from describing them as responsible persons. In 
order to do this one would have to go on to argue that we do 
not know what the phrase "responsible person" means. But 
the plain fact is that we do. Moreover, I am not at all 
sure that even the inhabitants of our imaginary world could
not know what the word "action" and hence "responsible per-\son" meant. In any case, if they could not know what "action" 
meant, it would be hard to understand how, if the empirical 
obstacles in the way of their doing anything were suddenly 
to disappear, they would recognize that for the first time 
they were performing actions. And for the same reason it 
would be hard to understand how the first man who ever per­
formed an action in the real world recognized that that was 
what he was doing. Nor would it do any good to say that he 
discovered that he was performing an action; for the very 
notion of discovery in this context seems to require that he 
be able to recognize what an action is.
What we have said of the disposition-describing use 
of "responsible" applies equally well to its opposite 
"irresponsible". Here, too, we can imagine a world in which 
all the inhabitants tried and systematically failed to act 
in contradiction with their obligations. Eventually, they 
would cease even trying; and yet even here we could speak of 
an irresponsible agent as one who would, if the empirical
21
obstacles were significantly altered, be motivated to go 
on trying to flout his obligations or simply go on flouting 
them. Thus, to revert to one of our examples. Smith, even 
if he, like Lord Reith, could not succeed in being respon­
sible for anything, let alone anything so unpleasant as 
the death of Jones, could still be considered as an irre­
sponsible person. And the same reason we gave for not 
calling Lord Reith a merely potentially responsible per­
son can with slight and obvious modifications be advanced 
for not calling Smith a merely potentially irresponsible 
person.
Thus far we have argued that the disposition-de­
scribing use of "responsible" is the basic one because its 
applicability is a necessary condition of the applicability 
of the others while the converse is not true. But, it may 
be argued in reply, whether or not the disposition-describ­
ing use of "responsible" is basic in this sense or not, i 
this is not the sense of "basic" that philosophers have 
had in mind when they have Jtn^hasized, as they often have, 
the responsibility-attributing use of "responsible" at the 
expense of the disposition-describing use. And this is 
probably true. One has only to think of two philosophers 
as utterly opposed to one another as F.H. Bradley and John
22
Stuart Mill both of whom concentrate on the responsibility- 
attributing use of "responsible" in order to appreciate the 
general agreement among philosophers that this use of 
"responsible" is the most basic one.^ On the other hand, 
however, when we ask what actually is the criterion or what 
actually are the criteria that such philosophers employ in 
terms of which they agree that the responsibility-attri­
buting use of "responsible" is the most basic one we seem 
to be left completely in the dark. In the case of Bradley 
and Mill, for example, their agreement seems to be based 
on nothing more than the unproven assumption that respon­
sibility is equivalent to accountability to someone or 
something for something. But this is simply to identify, 
and in a quite arbitrary manner, the notion of respon­
sibility with its responsibility-attributing use; and it 
does not help us to understand the other two uses of this 
notion.
But why, then, do they make this assumption? I 
suspect the answer to this question is intimately connected 
with the practical concern we naturally have with the possi­
bility of our being punished. For the notion of punishment 
goes hand in hand with the notion of accountability; we
4. Bradley, F.H., "The Vulgar Notion of Responsibility in Connexion with the Theories of Free Will and Necessity", Ethical Studies, 2nd edition, pp.l-4l. Mill, J.S., A dritical Examination of Sir William Hamilton * s Philosophy, 4th edition, pp.$85-606.
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are accountable among other things for falling to carry 
out the responsibilities that have been assigned or dele­
gated to us; and we are liable to punishment for our failure. 
Thus, there is something to be said, as there is by definition 
for all half-truths, for the one contained in Mill’s con­
tention that responsibility just is punishment; and even 
here it would have been more correct for him to have said 
that responsibility is the grounds for punishment.^ Worse, 
still, the undue emphasis on the purely accountable aspects 
of responsibility that it encourages tends to hide from us 
the role of imagination and reflection in the moral life.
For it is the disposition-describing use of "responsible" 
that makes clear the need for them. And by thus requiring 
us to stress the role of the intellectual virtues it at the 
same time helps us to appreciate that we are not simply crea­
tures with responsibilities and obligations for which we are 
accountable to someone or something. On the contrary, we are 
also autonomous agents with reason and imagination which 
allow us to reflect on the questions of how best to fulfil 
our obligations and what exactly our obligations are. And 
it is the person who thus reflects who is said to be a 
responsible person.
5. Mill, J.S., p.586.
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B
If it is true that the basic use of "responsible" 
is the disposition-describing one, then this fact must be 
expected to have a profound influence on our view of human 
consciousness. More specifically, it must lead us to think 
of our consciousness of obligation as a continuum as 
opposed to something that is by its very nature discon­
tinuous and episodic. Why, it will be asked, is this the 
case? I think the answer is clear once we remind ourselves 
that a responsible person is not only one who fulfils his 
obligations with reason and imagination but also one who has 
in his waking hours a permanent sense of obligation as op­
posed to one that comes and goes. Nor am I embarrassed by 
the fact that this commits us to the view that he has this 
sense of obligation even in moments of anger. For anger 
is surely to be distinguished from a fit of rage. The 
former by no means excludes the presence of a sense of 
obligation if only in the background whereas the latter 
does seem to exclude it. It is undoubtedly for this rea­
son that susceptibility to such fits is so hard to recon­
cile with the Judgment that so and so is a responsible per­
son. But this is surely Just another way of emphasizing 
the fact that a responsible person is one who is in his
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waking hours permanently aware of his obligations. -
There Is one obvious objection to be made to this 
conclusion. Why, It might be asked, did we speak of a 
disposition-describing use of "responsible" In the first 
place If we meant that It describes the permanent aware­
ness the agent has of his obligations? For, sùrely. It will 
be urged, a disposition Is not something of which we are 
permanently aware; on the contrary, to call something a 
.disposition is not only to deny that it is something that 
exists In some categorical sense but also to deny that it 
Is something of which we are or need be permanently aware.
In fact, the whole point of a dispositional analysis. It 
could be plausibly argued. Is to permit us to analyze cer­
tain properties alleged to be mental in terms of certain 
patterns of behaviour and thus permit us to short-circuit 
consciousness; and this interpretation would have the advan­
tage of being consistent with the behaviouristic tendencies 
of recent contributions to the philosophy of mind. On such 
an interpretation of a dispositional analysis, to say of 
someone that he Is a responsible person is tantamount to 
saying that in certain circumstances he will behave In cer­
tain ways. Thus, It Is only to be expected that saying 
someone is responsible has been compared to saying that 
glass is brittle, sugar is soluble and the like.
J) »  ^ V  « . I . , p.
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There are, however, serious difficulties involved 
In this interpretation of such an analysis. Or, at least, 
there are serious difficulties when it is applied to a 
notion like that of responsibility; for, if we wished to 
unpack all that is implied in calling anyone a responsible 
person, we should have an infinite series of different 
hypothetical propositions on our hands. Indeed, Professor 
Gilbert Ryle, one of the most ardent proponents of the inter­
pretation of the dispositional analysis In question, uses 
almost those very words In relation to the notion of a gre­
garious animal,^ But they apply equally well to the no­
tion of a responsible person. What Is Interesting, however. 
Is that Ryle does not Interpret this infinity of different 
hypothetical propositions as the reductlo ad absurdum of 
his position that it seems to be.
Nor, It hardly needs saying, does it do any good 
to describe a few ways In which a responsible person acts 
and then to end It with "and so on". For this suggests 
that your reader or listener could extend the list of hypo­
thetical propositions indefinitely and it invites him to 
do so. But this invitation could be a<geep ted with reason­
able hope of success only by someone who knew the rule 
according to which the series is constructed; or, to put 
it another way., he must know what the hypothetical propo-
6. Ryle, Gilbert, The Concept of Mind, p.44.
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sltlons already expressed by his predecessor have in common 
before he can continue the series. Otherwise, he would not 
know which propositions not yet expressed to include or ex­
clude. Unfortunately, however, this requirement can be 
satisfied In the case of a notion like that of a responsible 
person only by introducing the notion itself into the anal­
ysis; and this would allow him to say that if a person is 
responsible he will do so and so and such and such and all 
the other things a responsible person does. But this is 
hardly an acceptable procedure Just because it does re­
quire that what Is being analysed should be part of the 
analysis. Moreover, It would seem to Indicate that. If to 
be a responsible person is to be disposed to behave In cer­
tain ways. It Is also something more than that.
In all fairness to Ryle, however, we must take into 
account the distinction he makes between simple, single- 
track dispositions, the actualisations of which are nearly 
uniform,and dispositions the exercises of which are indef­
initely hetrogeneous.^ This distinction seems to parallel 
the one he makes later on between specific tendencies de­
scribed by specific or determinate words and generic tend­
encies described by generic or determinable words.^ Ac­
cording to Ryle, most "hlgher-grade" dispositions fall
7. Ryle, Gilbert, p.43-44.
8, Ryle, Gilbert, pp.117-18.
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within the latter group.9 Now, where simple, single-track 
dispositions described by specific or determinate words 
are involved the kind of dispositional analysis he advocates 
is shown to its best advantage; for here it seems entirely 
possible to regard the dispositional term as a short-hand 
device for referring to a number of things the person 
would do or does do in certain circumstances. Thus, to 
use one of Ryle's own examples, to say of someone that he 
is a cigarette-smoker is to say that he does and would smoke 
cigarettes on such and such o c c a s i o n s , A t  the same time 
the uniformity implied in the manifestations of such a 
disposition would in turn imply a significant resemblance 
among the propositions describing them. As a result, we 
should be equipped with a rule in terms of which we could 
continue such a series of propositions.
It is, unfortunately, for the proponents of the 
kind of dispositional analysis in question, an entirely 
different matter when it comes to the other kind of dis­
position that Ryle mentions. Here it is, to say the least, 
difficult to discover any significant resemblance among 
the propositions describing their manifestations that would 
justify their being grouped together. Indeed, Ryle's use 
of the word "heterogeneous" to describe such manifestations
9* Ryle, Gilbert, p.44.
10.Ryle. Gilbert, p.43.
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and "generic" to describe the disposition itself can only 
leave one confused. For, to take his use of "generic" first, 
it would be absurd to say that the word "responsible" in 
the notion of a responsible person describes a genus of 
which the various things that responsible people do are 
species. Worse still. It would beg the question at issue 
by assuming from the outset that the various things a 
responsible person does have something significant in com­
mon, namely, their all being species of the same genus, 
whatever that genus might be. Moreover, Ryle seems to con­
tradict himself on this score by emphasizing the hetero­
geneous character of manifestations of dispositions similar 
to the one in question; for, if they really are hetero­
geneous, then it is not surprising that we cannot find a
rule in terms of which we could continue with the series
of propositions describing such manifestations. In fact, 
at least part of what we mean by calling a collection of 
anything heterogeneous is that its members have nothing 
significant in common and have been collected at random.
Thus, we seem to be faced once more with the fact that our 
difficulties can be solved only by including the disposi­
tional notion to be analysed in the analysis itself.
One way of avoiding this unpalatable alternative, 
it might be thought, is to have recourse to the distinction 
between class-membership and the relationship between
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determinates of common determlnables. According to W.E. 
Johnson we subsume the determinate or specific colours of 
red, green and yellow under the common determinable, colour, 
because of a relation of difference among them qua colours 
and not because of anything they have in common with each 
other, again, qua colours, and this is for the very good 
reason that they have nothing In common qua c o l o u r s . N o w ,  
whether or not we agree entirely with Johnson on this issue, 
it is, I think, undeniable that he had an important in­
sight: it is not enough to say that red, green and yellow 
are merely different because, then, there would be no rea­
son to (^roup them together. As a result, it is easy to 
understand why Johnson is led to say that they are not 
only different from each other but also opposed to each 
other.
None of this, however, is relevant to Ryle’s analy­
sis of so-called generic dispositions or the heterogeneous 
manifestations they seem to involve; for, although it is true 
that something cannot be red and at the same time green, it 
is not true that a responsible person cannot do various 
things that such a person does and do them at the same time. 
In other words, there need be no incompatibility among the 
actions that manifest the disposition in question.
11. Johnson, W.E., Logic, vol. 1, p.174.
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What has gone wrong with the kind of dispositional 
analysis we have been examining? I think the fundamental 
error consists In a failure to distinguish between the 
meaning of a statement and the ways in which It la verlf 
fled; for the fact that a statement can be verified In a 
great variety of ways does not entail that It means a great 
variety of things. If It did entail this It would not even 
make sense to ask whether a conjunction of propositions 
used to describe the way a person behaves or would behave 
allows us to conclude that he Is, say, responsible. And 
this permits us to understand why Ryle’s analysis of so- 
called generic dispositions necessarily involves a refer­
ence to the disposition being analysed. îtore specifically. 
If the series of hypothetical propositions that such an 
analysis Involves describes the various ways of finding 
out whether a certain dispositional property is present, 
then it Is not surprising that they have nothing more in 
common than that for the presence of which they provide evi­
dence. As a result, that which unifies such a series must 
not be sought In the series Itself but outside of it. Or, 
more precisely. It must not be sought In such a series when 
we have Ryle’s so-called generic dispositions in mind.
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The distinction between the meaning of a statement 
and the various ways In which It Is verified Is most Impor­
tant for our purposes. It permits us to define a responsible 
person as one who In his waking hours Is permanently con­
scious of his obligations and at the same time to regard 
this characteristic as something predisposing him to behave 
in certain ways In certain circumstances. Indeed, it Is 
just because it does predispose him to act In certain ways 
In certain circumstances that we regard it as a disposition 
In the first place. What Is lnç)ortant to realise, however.
Is that as a disposition It Is something over and above the 
v/ays In which It predisposes the agent to act. In other 
words. It is a property of the person In a categorical 
sense, a part of his "nature".
This view will be criticized on the grounds that 
It commits us to speaking of states of consciousness that 
are In principle unobservable. I do not, however, find 
this criticism particularly damaging. It would be damaging 
If it entailed that the agent was absolutely the final arbi­
ter as to whether or not he was a responsible person. But 
It need not entail this at all. On the contrary, our In­
sistence on the various ways in which the presence of a 
dispositional property can be verified militates against 
such an interpretation. And It goes without saying that
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very often an observer will be in a position to tell the 
agent, despite his protestations to the contrary, that he 
is not a responsible person. Consequently, it would not 
be acceptable to define the notion of a responsible person 
in the way we have if it meant that such a person could act 
in any way he liked. But, then, it is hard to understand 
why anyone would want it to mean that unless he also wanted 
to draw a radical distinction between thought and action; 
and I can see very little reason for doing that.
10
There is, however, another criticism that may be 
directed against our view of a responsible person as being 
one who is permanently aware of his obligations. It is 
that on such a viev/ the moral agent becomes a duty-obsessed 
wretch lacking all spontaneity, the victim of a morally 
exacerbated conscience. Nor can there be any doubt that 
it is our emphasis on the permanent nature of such con­
sciousness that inspires such a criticism. But it is based 
on a failure to distinguish between what Maclagan has called 
"articulate foreground awareness" on the one hand and what 
we might call inarticulate background awareness on the 
o t h e r . I t  would seem that there are a great many things 
of which we are aware at any given moment in our waking
12. Maclagan, W.G., pp.99-100.
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life even though they do not at every given moment occupy 
the centre of our attention. Thus, although I am now con­
centrating on what I am writing, I am aware of my intention 
to meet some friends this evening. And the proof is that 
if someone asked roe what I planned to do this evening I 
should tell him straight off that I planned to meet some 
friends. Of course, I am not aware of this particular 
intention in the same way that I am aware of what I am 
doing at the moment or, at least, I was not aware in this 
way until what I was writing brought the particular in­
tention in question by some process of association into 
the foreground of my consciousness. This, however, only 
serves to justify our distinction between foreground and 
background awareness. For one thing is certain: I was in 
some sense aware of my intention to meet my friends. If I 
had not been how could I have told somebody straight off 
what I planned to do tonight?
Thid distinction between background and foreground 
awareness applies to awareness of obligation as well as to 
awareness in general. Thus, the fact that a responsible 
person is permanently aware of his obligations does not 
mean that he must sacrifice all Joy in living to the dic­
tates of an overbearing conscience. It simply means that 
any time in his waking life his sense of obligation will 
at least present a background against which his thoughts 
and actions are put in relief.
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At the same time, however, we must distinguish 
between background and foreground awareness on the one 
hand and the quite familiar notion of degrees of awareness 
on the other. Otherwise, we run the risk of confusing one’s 
background awareness of one’s obligations with a minimal 
degree of awareness of those same obligations. This could 
lead us seriously astray since it would encourage us to 
believe that the former implied a failure to appreciate 
fully what one’s obligations are. For, it is clear, to 
say that someone has a minimal degree of awareness of his 
obligations is not Just to say, if it is at all to say, 
that he has a background awareness of them. It is also to 
pass an unfavourable Judgment on his nK>ral character. As 
a result, it becomes clear that the background awareness 
of his obligations that a responsible person possesses must 
at the same time allow for a full awareness on his part of 
what his obligations are. In other words, the nature of 
the awareness in question must in no way detract from its 
object end must not depend for what it is, namely, a 
specifically background variety of awareness, upon a merely 
partial view of its object.
11
I think it is also worth pointing out that a respon­
sible person is not only permanently aware of his obli-
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gâtions but he is aware that is aware of them. And the 
same argument can be used to show that the person has an 
awareness of his own awareness as the one that might be 
used to show that the person knows what he knows. Or, 
more precisely, this is true if we have the strong sense 
of "knowing" in mind; for in that sense, "I am not in a 
position to say "I know" unless my grounds for saying so 
are such that they give me the right to disregard any 
further evidence or i n f o r m a t i o n . B u t  anyone who knows 
in this sense ipso facto knows that he knows since the 
evidence that permits him to establish the one also per­
mits him to establish the other. And I advise anyone who 
remains unconvinced to accept Schopenhauer’s invitation 
to try to imagine a state of affairs where he knov/s with­
out knowing that he knows or where he knows that he knows 
without possessing the first-level k n o w l e d g e , I t  can­
not be done. Nor can it be done for the notion of aware­
ness.
This is not to say that the awareness a respon­
sible person has of his obligations must occupy the centre 
of his attention. On the contrary, he usually has a back­
ground and not a foreground awareness of his ov/n awareness.
13. Hintikka, Jaakko, Knowledge and Belief, p. 20.
14. Schopenhauer, Arthur, Two Essays, translated by Mme.Karl Hellebrand, p.lo6.
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That is why Hintikka is right when he points out that "I 
am paying attention to the fact" cannot be made to entail 
"I am paying attention to the fact that I am paying atten­
tion to the f a c t . H e  is, however, wrong in my view 
when he goes on to contend that a person need not be aware 
of his own awareness tout court.
But why is it so important to establish that a 
responsible person is aware of his own awareness of his 
obligation? I think the answer to this question is to 
be found in Schopenhauer’s previously mentioned remarks 
on knowing. When they are adapted, as we said they should 
be, to awareness, it becomes clear that awareness of aware­
ness is a necessary condition of being aware of anything. 
Consequently, it is a necessary condition of one’s being 
aware of one’s obligations. In other words, it is not to 
be thought that in insisting on the person’s awareness of 
his own awareness we are insisting on something of only 
minor importance. It is, on the contrary, in virtue of 
what its denial would imply, of the first importance.
15. Hintikka, Jaakko, p.28.
16. Hintikka, Jaakko, p.28. It would be more accurate to say that Hintikka denies the virtual implication from "I am aware that £" to "I am aware that I am aware that £" but he does not deny the epistemic implication. For an elucidation of this distinction see p. 82 of Knowledge and Belief.
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Thus far we have argued that the concept of a 
responsible person requires us to think of our awareness 
of our obligation as something continuous. But surely 
this is not the whole of the matter. A responsible per­
son is not only one who is permanently aware of his obli­
gations but also one who responds to this awareness. In 
fact, it is not too much to say that awareness of obli­
gation is already in some form or another a negative or 
positive response to it. Conversely, a response is, as 
îfeolagan puts it, "distinctively a moment in personal 
living, something other than sub-personal reaction, only 
as it encloses an awareness of the demand that it either 
meets or e v a d e s . "^7 Nor can there be any doubt that the 
response of responsible persons to their awareness of 
obligation must in general be a positive one.
Incidentally, this juxtaposition of the words 
"response" and "responsible" in the phrase "responsible 
person" should not lead us, as it might have led others, 
to jump to the conclusion that etymologically, at least, 
a responsible person is Just one who is held answerable 
or accountable for his actions. On the contrary, even on 
the purely etymological level there is no reason to 
believe that in emphasizing the fact that he is one who
17. Maclagan, W.G., p.51.
39
is held answerable or accountable for his actions we are 
not at the same time emphasizing the fact that he can be 
held answerable or accountable. In other words, there Is 
no reason to believe that we are not emphasizing the fact 
that he is one who is permanently aware of his obligations. 
For, as we have maintained all along, it is only such a 
one who can rightly be held answerable or accountable for 
his actions.
It is, moreover, easily enough gathered from what 
we have said that on our view the moral consciousness of 
such a person is essentially of a dialectical nature.
Indeed, it is not too much to say that the truly respon­
sible person is engaged in a continuing dialogue with him­
self. Thus, when we speak of the moral demand and our 
response to it, our language is more than merely metaphor­
ical. It is, on the contrary, a quite legitimate analogical 
extension of notions more commonly associated with inter­
personal relations.
We must say more of the responsible person’s posi­
tive response to his awareness of his obligations. Such a 
response will often consist in something less than the 
actual fulfillment of the obligation. There are, for 
example, in many cases serious empirical obstacles in the
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way of the person’s doing what he thinks he ought to do. 
Thus, he might have made a promise to a friend to help him 
out of financial difficulty and then finds out that he no 
longer has the money and does not know anyone from whom he 
could borrow it. Nor are there only empirical obstacles 
that should concern us here: very often the person will 
think that such and such an action constitutes an appro­
priate response to a moral demand, when, in fact, it is 
quite inappropriate and possibly immoral. This, then, is 
where our earlier insistence on the reasonableness and the 
imaginativeness of the responsible person becomes important. 
Indeed, without these two qualities the logical contrast 
v;e can always make in a purely theoretical way between the 
awareness of obligation and obligation itself becomes an 
actual contradiction. Unfortunately, moreover, even with 
these two qualities and the best will in the world the 
contradiction often remains.
Before elucidating the familiar phrase "with the 
best will in the world" I think it worth pointing out that 
the moral agent is aware of an obligation to be imaginative 
and reasonable. This will, I suspect, strike some as pecul­
iar; for it is tempting to say that these two qualities 
are in some sense gifts that some are fortunate enough to 
possess and others not. On such a view it would be as 
pointless to insist that members of the latter category
'■r'
$
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have an obligation to be reasonable and imaginative as it 
would be to insist that someone with no musical skill has 
an obligation to be a great violinist. This, however, is 
to overlook the fact that if reasonableness and imaginative­
ness are gifts they are gifts that every man capable of 
being a moral agent possesses. This does not mean, of 
course, that every man fitting this description possesses 
them to the same extent. It does mean, on the other hand, 
that he does have an obligation, and one of which he is 
aware, to be as imaginative and reasonable as it is in his 
power to be in fulfilling his obligations.
But this brings us back to the phrase "with the 
best will in the world". For, on reflection, it might 
seem that a willingness to do what he takes to be the right 
thing and the sincere endeavour to do it that that involves 
are the most that can be asked of the moral agent. The 
notion of a sincere endeavour, however, raises the ques­
tion of whether the responsible person is aware cf anything 
more than an obligation to try to do what he takes to be 
the right thing, I think we can give an affirmative answer 
to this question. To think otherwise would be to make the 
error of assuming that, because we can sometimes usefully 
distinguish between trying to do something and actually 
doing it, we can always usefully distinguish between the
'A two. Such an assumption is, however, a gratuitous one:
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very often where there are no really serious empirical 
obstacles the person is obliged to do what he takes to be 
the right thing as opposed to merely trying to do it. In­
deed, on any other interpretation the very notion of trying 
loses all significance since it makes sense to try to do 
something only if the possibility exists that you can do 
something. And there is no reason to think that among the 
things you can do there might hot be included some of the 
things you ought to do.
Incidentally, this logical dependence of the no­
tion of trying upon the notion of doing gives us an insight 
into the former that complements what we shall have to say 
later on the same subject. The insight, to be more explicit, 
is that the notion of trying is most typically employed as 
a means of expressing hesitation as to the outcome of the 
action. That is, whenever the agent suspects there will be 
a disparity in the descriptions of what is being done at the 
time on the one hand and the state of affairs the doing will 
bring into existence on the other hand he is quite likely
to employ the notion of trying to qualify what is being done.
And the same holds true when an observer entertains the same 
suspicion. As Professor Eric D ’Arcy puts it:
We stress the trying when we anticipate that non-success is very, or quite,likely; the task is delicate, or intricate, or laborious, and people who do X in the hopeof effecting Y frequently fail to do so.
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A man whose car is giving trouble, and who has to ask some friends to push it in an attempt to start it 'on the run*, will bedescribed as 'trying to start his car';whereas the act of pressing the starter- button in normal circumstances is called simply 'starting the car'.
And further evidence for this interpretation is to be found 
in the fact that if there turns out to be no disparity the
agent and the observer can drop the notion of trying alto­
gether. Thus, if the agent succeeds in breaking down the 
door as a result of having tried to do so, he can describe 
what he has done and the observer can describe what he has 
done as having broken down the door tout court instead of 
having tried and succeeded in breaking it down.
But what if he does not succeed? The agent might 
be convinced that the door's being broken down will result 
from what he is doing now only to find that there are four 
very strong men holding it up and thus frustrating all his 
efforts; and let us assume for simplicity's sake that he 
stops whatever he is doing as soon as he finds this out. 
Now,in such a case as this the agent could afterwards 
quite appropriately say that he had been trying to break 
down the door even though at the time he would have said 
that he was breaking it down tout court.19 In other words, 
here, it would seem that the notion of trying is being
18. D'Arcy, Eric, Human Acts, p.51.
19. D'Arcy, Eric, p.34.
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used to emphasize what he failed to do. This is not to say, 
of course, that the agent's trying and failing to break down 
the door is not compatible with his doing other things that
he takes to be involved in the success of such an under­
taking. But it is to say that insofar as doing anything 
in this case is to be identified with breaking down the 
door the agent did nothing.
If what we have said is true, then to say that the
agent is obliged to try to do something is to say that he
is obliged to do it and to express hesitation about the re­
sult; and most typically this hesitation stems from the 
possibility of causal circumstances preventing him from 
carrying out his obligations. It is, however, essential to 
distinguish between allowing for this possibility and a flat 
refusal to believe that the agent can in the existing causal 
circumstances do what he is supposedly obliged to do. In 
the latter case there would be no point in insisting upon 
his obligations and to do so would engender the kind of per- 
formatory or pragmatic contradiction of which we spoke 
earlier. For, just as "ought implies can", so, to say that 
the agent ought to do something implies on the part of the 
sayer, if he is honest and knows what he is saying, the 
belief that he can do it in the existing causal circumstances. 
And since to refrain from acting can in a fundamental sense 
constitute a kind of action, it also implies the belief that
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he can refrain from doing things in the existing causal cir­
cumstances when this is interpreted as an obligation,
14
We must say something about the maxim already men­
tioned, namely, "ought in^lies can" if we are fully to 
grasp the significance of what we said about believing.
First of all, and this is a subsidiary point, it should be
clear that anyone who assents to this maxim and has the 
logical sense of implication in mind is committed to hold­
ing that "ought" has a descriptive content. Otherwise, it 
is hard to see how telling someone that he ought to do some­
thing can imply anything. For only propositions imply 
things and I take it that those who want to empty "ought" 
of its descriptive content want to say that telling sontôone 
that he ought to do something does not amount to asserting a
proposition. Nor does it help here to have recourse to a
logic ôf imperatives as opposed to a logic of propositions. 
And the reason is not hard to find: there is absolutely no 
temptation as there might be with telling someone that he 
ought to do something to construe telling him that he can do 
it as an imperative. On the contrary, to tell him that he 
can do it is plainly to assert a proposition.
The second and for our purposes more important point 
to be made about the maxim in question is that no sense can
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be made of the responsible person’s awareness of the moral 
demand unless it is also true to say, as Professor C,D.
Broad put it, "of an action, which was done, that it could 
have been avoided in some sense of "could" which is not 
definable in terras of "would have if".^^ In the same way,
"We must be ablé to say of a conceivable action, which was 
not done, that it could have been done in some sense of 
"could" which is not definable in terms of "would have if 
Or, to put things in the present tense, if the agent cannot, 
in the absence of a different set of causal circumstances, 
do other than what he does or what he refrains from doing, 
then the moral demand is rendered either superfluous or 
futile; and, as a result, his awareness of it as a genuine 
moral demand becomes at best problematic and at worst un- 
analyzable. It is rendered superfluous in those cases where 
its content coincides with what the causal circumstances 
will bring about and it is rendered futile when its content 
does not so coincide with what these circumstances will 
bring about.
But what if awareness of the moral demand is itself 
part of the set of causal circumstances? Surely, in that
20, Broad, C.D,, "Determinism, Indeterminism and Libertarianism", Ethics and the History of Philosophy, reprinted in Free Will, edited by (Sidney fergenbesser and James Walsh, pp.llB-132. See p,122.
21, Broad, C.D., p.122,
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case it would be neither superfluous nor futile. It would 
not be superfluous because in its absence the agent might 
not do what he otherv;ise would do and it would not be 
futile because it would contribute to bringing about the 
action. Everything, of course, turns on whether awareness 
of the moral demand can be considered itself part of the set 
of causal circumstances. Now, it seems to me that it cannot* 
In order to show this, however, we should have to say what is 
more appropriately said in a later chapter. More specifi­
cally, we should have to show that motives are not causes; 
and since awareness of the moral demand constitutes a motive, 
it cannot be a cause. But since the contention that motives 
are not causes will be ventilated later, we can only ask the 
reader to bear with us.
At the same time, however, it is worth remarking 
upon the oddity of the suggestion that awareness of the 
moral demand exercises a causal influence upon the agent.
For, if this were true, it would be hard to make sense out 
of the distinction between a genuine sense of obligation 
and what we described earlier as the dictates of an over­
bearing conscience. After all, it is the latter that pre­
sents itself in the guise of a cause. That is to say, it 
is something of which the agent is a victim in the same way 
that a person in the grips of an obsession or a person 
acting under some internal compulsion —  we shall have
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occasion to deal with these two cases later, in another 
connexion —  is a victim. On the other hand, a genuine 
sense of obligation does not seem to be assimilable to some­
thing of which the agent is a victim. Indeed, one of its 
distinguishing features is that it is something of which the 
agent is not a victim; and once this is forgotten we find 
that we are no longer talking of a genuine sense of obli­
gation at all but of a state of mind that borders on the 
pathological. It is interesting in this regard to note 
that a genuine sense of obligation differs significantly from 
other motives, whether we have character traits of which it 
is an example or desires in mind. More specifically, we do 
not have the same difficulty with the notion of someone who 
is the victim of his own ambition or of someone who iâ the 
victim of his desires. This is not to say that such a per­
son would be any healthier in spirit than the person suffer­
ing from the dictates of an over-bearing conscience. But 
what is important from our point of view is that the notion 
of sanity or control is, as it were, "built in" to the notion 
of the person who has a genuine sense of obligation, whereas 
the same cannot be said always of the ambitious or the 
desiring person,
A word of caution is in order. Nothing that we have 
said thus far commits us to the view that ambition or a par­
ticular desire constitutes a kind of cause. On the contrary.
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as vie shall argue later, neither character traits nor de­
sires are in the ordinary run of things correctly considered 
as causes. But the phrase "in the ordinary run of things" 
is to be emphasized since both can by degree, become causes 
as in the case of the person whom they render a victim. On 
the other hand, the difference between a genuine sense of 
obligation and an over-bearing conscience is not one of 
degree but one of kind. And it might very well be consid­
erations of this nature that those philosophers have in mind 
who emphasize the eternal conflict between duty and desire 
and treat the latter invariably and the former never as a 
cause. They are, however, in ray view, illegitimately 
assuming that a difference of degree can be safely ignored. 
In any case, it is only on such an assumption that a desire 
can be treated invariably as a cause.
But before doing anything else, we must say some­
thing more about an assumption that we ourselves have made. 
More specifically, I am thinking of the assumption that a 
cause is something in the face of which the agent is not 
really an agent at all but a patient. For it might be 
argued that this is not at all an essential characteristic 
of a cause and, as a result, both a genuine sense of obli­
gation and motives to which the agent is in no sense a slave 
can be treated as causes along with the rest. Now, it is 
undoubtedly true that in a broad sense of the term even the
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ordinary distinction between a cause and a reason is not 
drawn. But, as It will become evident in due course, it 
is not with the broad sense of the term that we are con­
cerned. And in this we are following the example of the 
vast majority of philosophers who have sought to defend 
freedom of the will and who have at the same time resisted 
the temptation to obscure their fundamental disagreement 
with the determinist by accepting a broader definition of 
one of the key terms in the debate.
il
It is, I think, clear from the above that we are 
committed to defending a non-causal kind of freedom of 
action; and by this we mean to refer more specifically to 
the non-causal freedom of intentional action that opposes 
the philosophical libertarian to the philosophical deter­
minist. But why, it might be asked, apart from all con­
siderations of whether there is such a non-causal freedom 
or not, should it have to be the non-causal freedom of 
intentional action? After all, intentional actions, even 
if the most common, are not the only kind of actions there 
is. On the contrary, actions can be classed as deliberate, 
voluntary, accidental, unintentional and so on. And, the
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objection continues, it might very well be the case that 
the non-causal freedom of one or more of these classes of 
actions is necessary as well if we are to make sense of the 
moral demand. Now, all this is true and no one who wants 
to argue for the non-causal freedom of specifically inten­
tional actions should feel the slightest temptation to 
deny its truth; for, as we shall try to show, to argue for 
the non-causal freedom of intentional actions is ipso facto 
to argue for the same kind of freedom for deliberate actions 
and voluntary actions.
Let us compare first deliberate and intentional 
actions. What is the difference between the following two 
statements: "X’s hitting Y over the head was an action 
that he performed intentionally (that he had intended to 
perform)" and "X hit Y over the head deliberately (after 
deliberation)"? When we way the former we seem to stress 
more the overt action that X performed. In fact, this 
notion is present in the very etymology of the word "intend" 
with its emphasis on the actual effort to achieve some 
goal, literally, to stretch out towards something (tenders, 
to stretch out). It is this stretching-out-towards-some­
thing characteristic of intending that renders it impos­
sible to make a clear-cut distinction between the inten­
tion and the intentional or intended action. In more gen­
eral terms, one could say that the very notion of conative
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activity is present in the notion of intending itself; 
and it is no doubt this that has led certain philosophers 
like Hampshire and Hart, wrongly, I think, to identify
ppintending with a kind of trying.
Before continuing with our comparison of inten­
tional and deliberate actions we should say something about 
our lumping together intentional and intended actions. For 
it may seem that what we have said applies more to the 
latter than to the former. After all, despite our insist­
ence on the difficulty in drawing a clear-cut distinction 
between an intention and an action we never meant to deny 
that there was such a distinction. With many intentional 
actions, however, this would have to be denied since many 
of them are not intended. In these cases the criteria for 
the application of the corresponding description seem to 
be of an exclusively behavioral nature. As a result, we 
must stipulate that when we speak of intentional actions 
we shall speak only of those that are intended. We shall, 
moreover, follow the same procedure with deliberate actions 
and actions performed after deliberation. What we said of 
intentional actions applies equally well to deliberate ones. 
And for much the same reason that we decided to treat only 
those intentional actions that were intended we shall treat
22, Hampshire, L, and Hart, H,L.A., "Decision, Intention and Certainty", Mind, LXVII, 1958, p.11.
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only those deliberate actions that were performed after 
deliberation.
But in what way does a deliberate action differ 
from an intentional one? I think that in the former case 
the emphasis is more upon the thinking, the weighing of 
alternative courses of action preceding the overt physical 
act. Here the deliberation can be more easily distinguished 
as an intellectual activity distinct from the overt, physi­
cal action that results from it than can the intending. 
Another way of putting it would be to say that both are 
rehearsals for action but that the latter resembles more 
the dress rehearsal the night before opening the play 
while the former resembles more the fundamental planning 
that goes into the staging and structuring of the play.
This, however, should not lead us to forget that 
the difference between the two is more a difference of 
emphasis than anything else. There is no sharp boundary- 
line between the two classes of action for the simple rea­
son that when the deliberation leads to a decision to per­
form an action the decision logically implies an intention 
to perform it. As a result, it can be said that an action 
performed deliberately is also performed intentionally.
It is not, on the other hand, true to say that every inten­
tional action is also a deliberate one; for we can think 
of examples where we have intended to do something, have
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done it and where we should not be said to have done it 
deliberately. Thus, we might on the spur of the moment de­
cide to pull the lever that sets off the fire alarm, intend 
to pull it and actually pull it. And here the force of the 
phrase "on the spur of the moment" is to rule out the 
weighing of the advantages and disadvantages of pulling the 
lever that would make us want to say that we had acted de­
liberately. This example shows, moreover,,how in some 
cases an intentional action can come very close to being 
an impulsive one,
16
What of voluntary actions? Surely, it might be 
argued, the non-causal freedom of voluntary actions is 
necessary if we are to make sense of the responsible per­
son’s awareness of the moral demand. Or, at least, this 
seems to have been the opinion of a great many philosophers 
who have made the free-will determinist controversy turn on 
the question of whether or not voluntary actions were non- 
causally free. It seems to me, however, that such an 
approach is likely to be misleading; for it must not be 
forgotten that an action is commonly described as voluntary 
in a context where there might be reason to think that the 
agent was in some way compelled to do what he did. In 
other words, the notion of voluntary action and the notion
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of an action performed under compulsion offset one another. 
The one is employed in circumstances where it would not 
seem peculiar to employ the other. In view of this, it is 
not surprising that many determinlsts, the most notable 
among them being Hume, have been only too happy to defend 
a determinism of voluntary actions: they thought this 
allowed them to hold that, so long as they were not com­
pelled, it made very little difference whether or not vol­
untary actions were caused. And once they had convinced 
their readers of this, they could, without unduly shocking 
their religious and moral sensibilities, go on to say that 
they in fact were caused. This logical maneouvring, how­
ever, is plausible only if we agree that an action's not 
being compelled of itself permits us to say that it is 
voluntary. Otherwise, the determinist has not made his 
point that the opposite of a voluntary action is not a 
causally determined one but one that the agent has been 
compelled to perform. Now, I see no reason to agree to 
this, but I do think that because the notion of a volun­
tary action is commonly employed in the way described it 
is easy to be led mistakenly into agreement.
It might be thought that the best way of resist­
ing this process is to remind ourselves that an action is 
voluntary only if it is preceded or accompanied by an act 
of will. Consequently, it will not be enough that the
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action in question was not compelled; if we want to be 
assured that it is voluntary we shall have, first of all, 
to assure ourselves that it was willed in the literal 
sense in which it involves an act of will. The difficulty, 
however, is that it is hard to know what this act of will 
is supposed to be. Admittedly, it might be possible to 
know what it was supposed to be if the expression referred 
to the ability certain privileged human beings are alleged 
to possess whereby they can will others to do things.
Those versed in the art of spiritualism, for exan^le, are 
alleged to possess this ability. But whatever one might 
think of spiritualism, it is not presumably the kind of 
willing associated with it that philosophers who have 
spoken of acts of will have had in mind; for they have not 
been interested in what a person can make others do by 
willing but in the events he causes in his own body in this 
way. And it is not at all clear what this could mean.
What, then, of an act of will's close relation, 
namely, an effort of will? Here, at least. It is easy 
enough to know what is meant by the phrase. Making an 
effort of will is a relatively common form of activity in 
which we all at some time or another engage. On the other 
hand, however, it can hardly be regarded as something we 
do every time we perform a voluntary action. And thus it 
can hardly be regarded as a necessary condition of our per­
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forming a voluntary action. Admittedly, we could extend 
the notion of an effort of will so that it was co-extensive 
with the notion of a voluntary action; but I do not see how 
we could do this without being prepared to sacrifice cer­
tain of the specific characteristics of the former. And 
such a procedure would seem to be self-defeating.
The best way of resisting the temptation to say 
that an action's not being compelled of itself permits us 
to say that it is voluntary is to remind ourselves, that 
voluntary actions are a sub-class of intentional ones. Nor 
is anything changed, as Miss Q.E.M. Anscombe seems to think, 
by the fact that some voluntary actions come about as a re­
sult of the agent's permitting them to happen because they 
please him but where he does not initiate t h e m , F o r  it 
is equally clear that some intentional actions come about 
in the same way. Thus, a person might permit himself to be 
caressed and have intended all along to permit himself to 
be caressed. Here, presumably, the person derives a cer­
tain pleasure from being treated in this way and he initi­
ates no action. Yet simply by Virtue of the fact that he 
intended it all along his permitting himself to be caressed 
is intentional. It would, moreover, remain intentional 
even if he had not intended it. And the fact that the 
agent does not initiate any action is strictly irrelevant.
23. Anscombe, O.E.M., Intention, pp.89-90.
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But if a voluntary action is an Intentional one the 
converse does not hold; for we can easily imagine a case 
where the agent does something under compulsion and yet 
does it intentionally. Thus, a bank clerk may open his 
till at gun-point and this would be done intentionally 
although not voluntarily. Now there is very little tempta­
tion to say that an action's not being compelled of itself 
permits us to say that it is intentional. But since vol­
untary actions are intentional the same will apply to them. 
Or, more precisely, since we have in mind those intentional 
actions that are actually intended, the same will apply to 
those voluntary actions that are both intentional and in­
tended. This, however, amounts to saying that it would be 
less misleading to concentrate on intentional actions and 
not voluntary ones in trying to evaluate the pros and cons 
of the free-will determinist controversy.
II
This conclusion, it must be added, holds only if 
the notion of an intentional action is itself not usually 
employed in such a way as to mislead. And there are some 
who would maintain that it is employed in such a way. It 
is, admittedly, true that we usually specify that an action 
is intentional in circumstances where there might be some 
reason to think that it was performed unintentionally, 
accidentally, by mistake and so on. As a result, it might
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be thought to be tempting to regard an Intentional action 
merely as an action that is not performed in any of these 
ways. And this would be comparable to regarding a volun­
tary action as one that the agent is not compelled to per­
form and where its being caused or not has very little to 
do with the matter. In fact, however, the notion of an 
intentional action, instead of being parasitic in this nega­
tive way on these other actions, provides, to continue with 
the metaphor, the necessary nourishment with which they can 
sustain themselves. Or, to put it in more literal terms, 
an intentional action is the paradigm case of an action 
and the others are only more or less degenerate instances 
thereof. As a result, when we speak of an action we 
usually have in mind an intentional one; and we are little 
moved by the fact that an action's being intentional ex­
cludes it from being several other things.
It is true, on the other hand, that when we specify 
that an action is intentional instead of leaving it to be 
understood by the context we do usually want to make it 
clear that it excludes its being some other kind of action. 
That is why such a procedure is associated with the attri­
bution of responsibility where it is very important to 
establish how the action in question was performed. We 
are not, however, primarily interested in limiting the no­
tion of an intentional action in this way. If we were, we
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should have concentrated on the responsibility-attributing 
use of "responsible" and not the disposition-describing use.
As for those other kinds of action that we mentioned 
but did not elaborate upon, namely, actions perforiæd unin­
tentionally, accidentally, and by mistake, I do not think 
that anyone would seriously consider them as bearers of non- 
causal freedom; and it would, as a result, be a self-defeat­
ing enterprise from the start to make the responsible per­
son's awareness of the moral demand depend on them.
We should, however, say something about involuntary 
and unintentional actions. In the case of involuntary 
actions it should be pointed out that they do not offset 
voluntary ones. On the contrary, despite the terms employed 
to describe them the notion of a voluntary action and the 
notion of an involuntary one function more independently 
the one from the other than one might have originally sus­
pected. Thus, as we have already seen, we normally empha­
size the voluntary nature of an action when we wish to make 
it clear that the agent was not compelled to do what he did 
and not to reject the suggestion that it was involuntary.
And this remains true even though an action's being volun­
tary is as a matter of fact incompatible with its being 
involuntary. On the other hand, to say that an action was
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involuntary is to deny that it was intentional. As a
result, it can safely be said that sneezes, twitches and
the like are, as examples of involuntary actions, also 
examples of unintentional actions since the former is a 
sub-class of the latter.
Now the reason why we have insisted on the fact that 
involuntary actions do not offset voluntary ones is to dis­
pel the illusion that here at last we may have found a cri­
terion, albeit a negative one, for voluntary actions,
namely, their not being involuntary. For it is only in 
virtue of the facL that voluntary actions are intentional 
that an action’s being voluntary can be said to exclude its 
being involuntary. As a result, once again the conclusion 
is forced upon us that the identifying marks of a voluntary 
action are related to its role as a kind of intentional 
action, the specific purpose of which is to offset those 
actions the agent performs under compulsion.
As for unintentional actions, of which involuntary 
.actions are a sub-class, we should say something about them 
if only because certain actions have often been thought to 
be of this kind when they are in reality intentional. I 
have in mind in this connexion not involuntary actions but 
the consequences of an intentional action that the agent 
knows will result from that action, but to which he is more 
or less indifferent. It is, admittedly, true that the
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agent does not aim to bring them about. Thus, if we were 
to confine the scope of intentional actions to what the 
agent aimed to bring about, then they could not be called 
intentional. But there seems to be little Justification 
for this procedure.
If what we have said is true, then Hampshire and 
Hart are wrong when they say, to use their example, that 
the loud noise involved in shooting at someone Is not some­
thing the agent did intentionally and not something he in­
tended even though he knew it would be an unavoidable re-
piisuit of what he was doing. First of all, it seems clear 
that,,in these circumstances, making the loud noise would 
be intentional and this characteristic of the action would 
be underlined in the appropriate legal or moral circum­
stances. and, needless to say, this is true whether we 
decide, as we have done, to confine ourselves to those 
intentional actions that are intended or not. Secondly, 
unless we stipulate that intending is to be confined to 
what the agent aims to do, the agent could be said to have 
intended to make a loud noise. For example, if the agent 
intending to shoot at someone replied, upon being told by 
his companion what his action would involve, that he in­
tended to shoot anyway, then there would be nothing peculiar 
about his companion’s informing us that his friend intended 
to make a loud noise.
24. Hampshire, L. and Hart, H.L.A., p.7.
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None of this is new. On the contrary, as D'Arcy
puts it in interpreting Bentham:
Provided there be no mlssuposal, advisedness with regard to the presence of a given circum­stance, and its materiality, to a given con­sequence extend the intionailty from the act to that consequence. ïf Tyrrel's act of shooting the arrow was intentional, and ad­vised as to the circumstances 6f its likely direction and speed, the King’s approach, and so on, then the consequence of the King's death was also intentional. ’Perhaps he did not positively wish it; but for all that, in a certain sense he intended it.
And D ’Arcy makes it clear that for Bentham an act is ad­
vised with regard to a given circumstance if the agent is 
aware of the existence of that circumstance, or of its 
materiality to a given consequence. Provided, then, that 
the person is not mistakenly persuaded of the existence of 
that circumstance, or of its materiality to a given conse­
quence, "advisedness with regard to the presence of a given 
circumstance, and its materiality to a given consequence, 
extend the intentionality from the act to that consequence, 
It should be noted, moreover, that for Bentham it is 
only in a certain sense that Tyrrel can be said to have in­
tended to kill the King. The implication would seem to be 
that there is another sense in which he cannot be said to 
have intended to kill the King. And the only candidate
25. D'Arcy, Eric, p.l04.
26. D'Arcy, Eric, p.104.
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would seem to be intending as aiming, as we have main­
tained all along.
Another observation before leaving Bentham: he, 
like us, is very much concerned to emphasize the person's 
awareness in this context and, I suspect, for the same rea­
son. For it would be sheer folly to insist that the per­
son intends all the consequences of that which he aims to 
do. On the other hand, the fact that he does intend the 
known consequences is proof positive of the irrelevance in 
this context of the person's attitude towards those conse­
quences.
This explains why Miss Anscombe seems to be wrong, 
although closer examination of her remarks reveals that 
she is not, when she says, to use her example, that a per­
son's replenishing the house water-supply with poisoned 
water is .not intentional if he can truly reply to the ques­
tion 'Why did you replenish the house water-supply with 
poisoned water?' 'I didn't care about that, I wanted my 
pay and just did my usual job'.^? But any misunderstand­
ing there might be here is cleared up when she remarks a 
little later that such a reply will not absolve the person
pQfrom guilt of murder. In other words, she is making an 
implicit appeal to our distinction between intending and
27. Anscombe, O.E.M., pp.41-42.
28. Anscombe, O.E.M., p.45.
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aiming since his not being absolved from guilt of murder 
can only be explained if the action was intentional; and 
Anscombe*s real point is that it was not what the person 
aimed to do. Obviously, when we are concerned with the 
latter notion, the person's attitude to the consequences 
of his action is not at all irrelevant; and Anscombe was 
right in pointing this out.
Hampshire and Hart, for their part, may also be 
talking of intending when they really have aiming in mind 
when they maintain that of the person in their example "it 
would be misleading to say he intentionally made the noise, 
or that he intended to make the noise; for this would sug­
gest that this is what the agent would say that he was 
doing, if a s k e d . F o r  what the person would say he was 
doing if asked does not set definite limits on what he did 
intentionally or what he intended where intending is not 
made to involve aiming, although it does, I think, set def­
inite limits on what he intended where intending is made to 
involve aiming. That is, the agent is in a privileged posi­
tion when it comes to describing what he aimed to do. And 
even then we have to qualify our remarks. For, to use 
Hampshire and Hart's example again, if the agent gave all 
the Indications of making a concerted effort to shoot at 
someone, then the onus would be upon him to prove that that
29. Hampshire, S. and Hart, H.L.A., p.7.
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was not what he was aiming at doing and it would not likely 
be enough for him simply to deny that he had been aiming at 
shooting the other person. Likewise, in Anscombe's example, 
as she herself indicates, if the person was hired by the 
poisoner to pump the water, knowing that it was poisoned, 
it will do him no good to say that he does not care and 
that he Just wants the m o n e y . O n  the contrary, by accept­
ing the commission by the acceptance and performance of which
he gets the money, he puts himself in a position where he
can be said to aim to pump the poisoned water.
30. Anscombe, O.E.M., p.44.
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Chapter II
INTENDING AND ACTING
We have argued that If any class of actions is to 
be the bearer of non-causal freedom and thereby allow us 
to make sense of the responsible person's awareness of the 
moral demand it will be the class of intentional actions.
It is now time to show that an action's being intentional 
is logically incompatible with its being causally deter­
mined. And a necessary step in this process is to determine 
in general what this procedure involves. Broadly speaking, 
those who seek to defend a non-causal variety of freedom of 
intentional action can concentrate either on the action or 
the intention or both. And historically those who have 
chosen the second of these alternatives have been very much 
concerned with the notion of decision since deciding and 
intending are so intimately related. The second of these 
alternatives is, moreover, the one we have chosen. This 
amounts to saying that, although we believe there are non- 
causally free decisions, we believe the relationship between 
the intention resulting from such a decision and the action 
to be a causal one. As a result, the task before us has 
both a negative and a positive aspect: we must try to
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refute those who hold that the relationship between an 
Intention and an action is other than a causal one and we 
must show that decisions are non-causally free. Nor should 
it occasion much surprise that an important part of our 
task is to refute a position held by certain libertarians. 
On the contrary, in the hoary debate over non-causal free­
dom it is only to be expected that the opposing camps would 
end by differing on certain issues even among themselves. 
Thus, it is not only a question of choosing a camp but also 
of choosing a tent within it, preferably one that is well- 
constructed.
In line with this approach, moreover, we shall, 
after trying to show that intentions cause actions, go on 
to list some of the limitations on the scope of decisions. 
In this way we shall avoid certain misinterpretations to 
which a defence of the non-causal freedom of decision has 
been subjected. But more of this later.
Let us go into the reasons given by those who main­
tain that the relationship between an intention and an 
action is other than a causal one. One reason that Pro­
fessor A.I. Melden gives in his book Free Action is based 
on the contention that there can be no logically necessary 
connexion between a cause and an effect. This, we are told.
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Is what Hume taught us If he taught us nothing else. There 
Is, however, such a connexion between an intention and an 
action; for an intention cannot be described without refer­
ence to the action intended; and this is merely another way 
of saying that an intention is an intention to do something.^ 
Now, I think the first thing one wants to say here is that 
Melden seems to be confusing the descriptions of things with 
the things themselves. How else could he be led to believe 
that what is true of a relationship between the former must 
somehow be equally true of the relationship between the 
latter? Or, to talk in terms of concepts instead of descrip­
tions, how else could he be led to believe that a logical 
relationship between concepts must somehow be reflected in 
a logical relationship between that to which they apply?
The asnwer would seem to be that he could be led in no 
other way to believing this short of a full-fledged commit­
ment to the view that there is no real distinction to be 
made between concepts and their objects. But Melden, I 
take it, is not an idealist; he does not believe, officially 
at least, that the best way to carry out an empirical inves­
tigation is to carry out a conceptual one. And the relation­
ship between having an intention and acting upon it is 
surely the proper object of an empirical investigation in
1. Melden, A.I., Free Action^, pp.52-53  ^ 88-89, 93. Melden applies this argument to willing and motives but he would seem to have intentions in mind as well.
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the broadest sense of the term.
But even If we ignore the confusion between con­
cepts and objects, Melden's argument is rebutted by a 
counter-argument employed by Mr. Brice Noel Fleming in his 
article ”on Intention”, I can do no better than to quote 
him:
X cannot be the cause of y if the occurrence of X either entails or is entailed by the occurrence of y: for example, a man's taking a wife cannot be the cause of his getting married. This is the sort of necessary con­nection that is incompatible with x's being the cause of y : but this is not the sort of necessary connection that holds between an intention and the action intended. Most in­tentions have to be carried out; but any particular intention can fail to be carried out. I can intend to close the door without closing it, and I can close the door without intending to. The Intention is one thing, the action intended another; and so far it remains possible for them to be causally as well as necessarily connected.^
Before leaving Wfelden I think it should be indi­
cated that, although he does not distinguish between the 
intentional object of the intention or if you prefer, the 
objective reality of the intention on the one hand and the 
performed action or, again, if you prefer, the formal real 
Ity of the intention on the the other hand, nothing can be 
made to turn on this. More specifically, it cannot form 
the basis of an additional criticism of Melden's position.
2. Fleming, Brice Noel, "On Intention”, The Philosophical Review, DCXIII, p.320.
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It could do this only if what was intended (the intentional 
object of the intention or its objective reality) and what 
was performed (the formal reality of the intention) were 
not one and the same thing. For then, to maintain, as 
Melden does, that an intention cannot be described without 
reference to the action intended would be entirely different 
from maintaining that an intention cannot be described with­
out reference to the action intended and performed. But 
the truth of the matter is that it is the same action now 
intended and then performed. Indeed, if it were not, it 
would follow that we could never perform what we intended. 
But this is absurd.
But let us return to more immediate concerns. It 
should not be concluded that because the intention is one 
thing and the action another the two are only àocidentally 
related. And if the notion of causality is being inter­
preted in such a way as to imply this, then we shall have 
to stop interpreting it in this way. Indeed, one reason 
for our earlier emphasis on the conative aspect of intend­
ing was to deny just such an accidental relationship. For 
in its absence we should have to say that the agent just as 
a matter of brute fact happened to do what he intended to 
do. Thus, to use a concrete example, the fact that, in­
tending to go to the cinema, he actually went there instead 
of going to the football stadium, would have to be attri­
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buted to the way things Just happen to happen. This, how­
ever is absurd. To quote a very apposite passage from 
Fleming, even if what he has to say' there is not entirely 
satisfactory:
intentions have much more than a some­time, apparently accidental conjunction with the doing of the actions intended. If we are to have intentions, what we mean to do and what we in fact do must not be at odds most of the time; otherwise, thinking that we are going to do things would be, at the best, more like what we now call thinking about doing them, or even idle daydreaming. And this is putting the point weakly. For in the case in question, actions could not be actions as they are now. because at least part of the meaning of acting” or "doing something" depends on the nonaccidental, customary, coincidence of plan and performance; as a rule, what is planned, in the sense of "intended" gets performed. Or, at least, we could say, what we do is significant in the way it is because as a rule, it em­bodies what we plan; Just as what we plan is significant in the way it is because, as a rule, it leads to its embodiment in what we do. And since in the case in ques­tion there would be neither continuity nor development in our lives as there is now, our sense of ourselves as active beings would be impossible. Our lives could not make the sense they do now, and it is hard to see how they could make any sense at all.3
Still, why is this not entirely satisfactory? With
what do we wish to take issue? It is with the phrase "as
a rule" that Fleming uses three times in the passage we
have Just quoted. For example, he says that, as a rule,
what is planned, in the sense of "intended" gets performed.
3. Fleming, Brice Noel, p.318.
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Now, the trouble with his use of this phrase In this and 
related contexts In the passage quoted is that despite the 
true and interesting things the passage contains about the 
consequences of the viev/ being rejected it might au fond 
serve only to make the passage restate Just such a view.
For, if by his use of "as a rule" Fleming means to refer 
to what regularly happens,,and this is one way we use the 
phrase in question, then there is no guarantee that what 
the agent intends and what he does are not just accidentally 
conjoined . After all, there is nothing logically wrong 
with accidents that occur regularly. On the other hand, 
if by his use of "as a rule" Fleming means to refer to what 
the agent does as a matter of policy, then it is surely 
false to say that the agent as a matter of policy does what 
he intends. For this would suggest that in the absence of 
such a policy the agent might very well go through life 
never doing what he intends. After all, why adopt a policy 
unless it is possible to flout it and to flout it system­
atically. But, as Fleming has been at pains to point out, 
it is not possible to go through life never doing what we 
intend and still have the notions of intention and action 
that we do have. Finally, if by his use of "as a rule"
Fleming means to refer to an actual rule to the effect that
what is intended must get performed, then he is surely
wrong because there is no such rule. Nor would it do any
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good if he were referring to an actual rule of language to 
the effect that when the agent says he intends to do some­
thing he must do it or be charged with misusing language 
because, again, there is no such rule. Indeed, even though 
people regularly do what they say they intend to do, nothing 
is changed in this regard since,a great many contemporary 
philosophers to the contrary, a linguistic regularity is 
not a linguistic rule. As a result, it must be concluded 
that Fleming has not shown us the reason why intending and 
doing what is intended are not Just accidentally conjoined, 
although he has shown us some of the curious consequences 
that would result if they were accidentally conjoined.
But to show why they are not accidentally conjoined he 
would have had to insist as we have all along on the conative 
aspect of intending.
Our emphasis on the conative aspect of intending 
should not, as we hinted earlier, lead one to Identify in­
tending with the narrower notion of trying. Hampshire and 
Hart seem to do Just this when they say that a person who 
intends to do something is logically committed to believing 
that he will at least try to do it.^ We can, however, 
think of cases where the agent intends to do such and such 
an action partly because he is convinced that he will not 
have to try. This is particularly true where the agent is
4. Hampshire and Hart, p.11.
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not at all enthusiastic about doing something end where he 
is not prepared to go out of his way to do it. On the 
other hand, however, we should not be taken to mean that 
the agent even here does not have to be prepared to expend 
a certain amount of physical and mental energy. But all 
that proves is that trying is not to be confused with this 
latter process. Nor should we be taken to mean that in­
tending to do something does not in the great majority of 
cases result in trying to do it. To deny this would be to 
deny an obvious truth. Fortunately, we do not have to deny 
this in order to deny that intending and trying are logi­
cally related.
But what, then, do we emphasize when we emphasize 
the conative aspect of intending as a means of elaborating 
on the kind of causal relationship that exists between in­
tending and acting. I think this question is answered if 
we keep in mind what we said earlier about the etymology of 
the word "intend" (tenders, to stretch out) along with 
Fleming's reference to the notion of an active being which 
intending like anything conative presupposes. Now, as it 
has often been remarked, it is next to impossible to explain 
either the notion of an active being or conation in any non­
circular sense. We know how to use the expressions because 
we are active beings ourselves; and this is another way of 
saying that for us no such explanation of these notions and.
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for that matter, the nature of the causal relationship be- 
tv/een intending and acting would be necessary even if it 
were possible. Explanation, after all, does come to an 
end. And when it does come to an end it is better to real­
ize this fact than to import pseudo-explanations that cry 
out themselves for explanation. I am thinking especially 
of the pseudo-explanation that consists in saying that the 
causal relationship between an intention and an action is 
a contingent one. For this amounts to employing a term 
that is customarily and unproblematically employed to 
describe the negative fact that a given proposition does 
not entail another one to describe a relationship between 
two things in the world. As a result, not only do we con­
fuse logic and reality but, by taking the notion of con- 
tingency to describe a positive relationship, we commit 
ourselves to a contradictio in edjecto. And things are 
made no better by those philosophers who speak of a radi­
cally contingent relationship between intentions and actions. 
What one wants to ask, is the difference between a radi­
cally contingent relationship and no relationship at all?
The fact that it is not possible to give a non- 
circular explanation of "active being", "conati^Q" and 
ultimately "intention" suggests an important distinction 
between knowing what an expression means and being able to 
explain its meaning in a non-circular way. Nor is this
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distinction relevant only to the expressions at hand. On 
the contrary, it is in an obvious sense equally true of 
such expressions as "or" and "and" for which there are no 
approximate synonyms; for without synonyms there can be no 
explanation of these expressions and a fortiori and trivially 
no non-circular explanation. Indeed, even for those expres­
sions that have synonyms, we can know what the expressions 
mean without being able at this very moment to specify 
synonyms for them. And again, it is trivially true that 
since we cannot explain such expressions at the moment we 
cannot a fortiori explain them in a non-circular way either 
at the moment. If, on the other hand, we^were not active 
beings, who had intentions our only reaction to such expres­
sions as "active being" "conation" and "intention" would be 
one of blank incomprehension and we should not even try to 
explain them. Or, to make a con^arison, the reaction would 
be not unlike the one to be expected from a totally amoral 
man on being told that he should hearken to his sense of 
moral obligation.
B
There is another kind of logically necessary conne­
xion that exists between an intention and the action in­
tended; and this, too has been thought to exclude the
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possibility of a causal relation between the two. At least,
this seems to be the thinking of Mrs. Philif>pa Foot in the
following passages
  where motives are intentions it isclear that they cannot be determining causes; for intending to do x and being ready to take the steps thought necessary to do x are con­nected not empirically but analytically. A man cannot be said to have an intention un­less he is reconciled to what he believes to be the intermediate steps. We cannot speak as if the Intention were something which could be determined first, and "being ready to take the necessary steps" were a second stage following on the first.5
Now, I think it is clear that this contention, unless it 
is seriously qualified, will not even appear plausible.
First of all, it should be indicated that not all actions 
involve intermediate steps in their performance. Thus, 
when the agent raises his arm he does not do something else, 
say, move his muscles in order to move his argi.. So, here, 
it would be in Foot's interest if we interpreted her as 
saying that a man cannot be said to have an intention un­
less he is reconciled to carrying out the action, or, what 
amounts to the same thing, unless he is ready to carry it 
out at the appropriate time. Secondly, and this is a real 
difficulty, for Foot, the agent intends to do a great many 
things at some unspecified time in the future. For example,
5. Foot, Philippa, "Free Will as Involving Determinism",The Philosophical Review, DXVT, 1957, p.444, reprinted in I^ ree Will edited by Sidney Ptorgenbesser and James Walsh, p.75. All future references will be made to the reprint.
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he may Intend to write out a cheque for all his staggering 
debts —  someday. But in such a case it will not do to 
say, as Foot is committed to saying, that, subject to the 
qualification already mentioned, the agent is reconciled 
to what he believes to be the intermediate steps. On the 
contrary, here, the force of the "someday" is to impress 
upon us the vagueness of the frame of mind in which the 
agent finds himself; he is only in a very ill-defined way 
reconciled to what he believes to be the necessary steps.
In order to avoid any possibility of confusion at 
this point we must distinguish the case just mentioned 
from the one in which the agent's carrying out his inten­
tion someday is made contingent upon certain specific con­
ditions being satisfied. Indeed, very often the word "some­
day" is employed as a device for introducing a list of such 
conditions. Thus, the agent might very well say, "Someday, 
when I become manager of the firm, receive my father's 
legacy and marry a rich woman, I intend to write out a 
cheque for all my staggering debts." Here, the agent is 
clearly reconciled to what he believes to be the necessary 
steps but he is not prepared to take them in the present 
circumstances.
But what of the first-mentioned case where he is 
not so clearly reconciled to what he believes to be the 
necessary steps? Foot could maintain that such intentions
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are imperfect. And there would be a precedent for this 
kind of distinction. After all, in French we can still 
talk of "velleites" even if it is only very rarely that 
we talk of "velleities" in English. A velleite^ is defined 
by Larousse as a "volonteTimparfaite" or an "intention 
fugitive" but there seems to be no reason why we could not 
speak of an "intention imparfaite" or in English an imper­
fect intention instead of a "volonté imparfaite". And an 
imperfect intention could be taken to be one where the 
intender is not fully reconciled to what he believes to 
be the necessary steps to accomplishing what he intends.
At any rate, some distinction along these lines would seem 
to be required if we are to get clear on the relation be­
tween intending and acting.
If, however, we do decide to adopt the phrase "imper­
fect aim" we' must be consistent in our use of it. More 
particularly, we must resist whatever temptation there might 
be to talk in terms of weak aims instead. The latter, in 
fact, do not exist. Or at least they do not exist as they 
are usually described. As some philosophers will have it, 
a weak aim or, as they prefer to call it, a weak intention 
is one that a person supposedly has when he sees that some­
thing is going to happen and allows it to happen even though 
he could prevent it from happening. But where is the inten­
tion here? Surely, if a person intends to do anything in 
this case, and in the absence of further details we cannot
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be sure that he does, it is either to prevent whatever it 
is from happening or to allow it to happen. In the first 
case, his failure to carry out his intention might lead us 
to call him weak-willed but that does not license talk of 
weak intentions; a weak-willed person has the ordinary kind 
of intention but fails to stick to it. Similarly, if he 
intends to allow the event to happen there is nothing 
unusual about the intention. But, unlike the first case, 
neither would there be any reason to think that he was weak- 
willed since he did what he intended to do. The notion of 
allowing something to happen may sometimes, however, in­
volve something like what we have called an imperfect aim. 
Thus, to return to our original example, a man’s aiming to 
write out a cheque for all his staggering debts —  someday 
may simply amount to an unwillingness on his part to do 
anything that would render the fulfillment of such an aim 
impossible.
We must, however, along with Foot, anticipate the 
objection that talk of imperfect intentions simply trivi­
alizes the entailment that supposedly exists between in­
tending and being ready to take the steps thought neces­
sary to its fulfillment. For, it might be suggested, we 
are now saying that there is such a relationship excepting 
in those cases where there is not. In other words, it 
might be suggested that the introduction of imperfect inten­
tions is merely an ad hoc device for handling the many
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exceptions that one can oppose to the rule. Now, I think 
this objection would be a valid one only if the notion of 
an imperfect intention were not indispensably in other 
contexts. But, as a matter of fact, it is an absolutely 
essential distinction that must be drawn whenever we seek 
to elaborate in a serious manner upon the notion of an 
intention. And thus it cannot be Interpreted as being 
merely an ad hoc device that serves our and Foot's 
immediate purpose.
But to return to Foot. Even if we try, as we have, 
to put the best light upon her original contention, it will 
not hold; for the most she can be taken to have shown is 
that intending to do something entails being ready to take 
the steps thought necessary to doing it. But being ready 
to do something is not the same as actually doing it. As 
a result, there is still plenty of room in which to drive 
a causal wedge between the readiness and the doing with the 
result that the former could be taken to cause the latter. 
Moreover, if, as I believe, the entailment relation between 
intending to do something and being ready to take the steps 
believed necessary reflects a fundamental identity between 
the two, then we can still talk of a causal relation between 
intending and doing. As a result. Foot's argument to the 
contrary must be Judged in the final analysis ineffective.
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One might still be tempted, however, to try where 
Foot seems to have failed. Thus, one might argue that, 
keeping in mind all the qualifications that have been made 
thus far, intending to do something logically involves 
taking the necessary steps or, at least, the steps thought 
necessary to doing it and not Just being ready to take the 
steps thought necessary. Now, anyone who wanted to argue 
in this way would have to make an exception of those cases 
where empirical obstacles might prevent the fulfillment of 
the intention. MDreover, it would have to be made clear 
that the agent does not change his mind. And even then, 
with the relationship between intending and acting described 
in so qualified a manner it is far from clear that we have 
not been talking about a causal relationship all along.
For even a relationship that is incontestably causal can 
be described in the same way with the result that the cause 
comes to entail the effect; all one has to do is to include 
in the description the proviso that there are no contra- 
causal circumstances to be considered and the cause obtains. 
As a result, we must keep in mind the distinction between the 
causal relationship itself and our description of it Just as 
we had to distinguish between intentions and actions and our 
descriptions of them. The fact that the latter relationship 
can be converted into a rather trivial entailment relation­
ship in the manner indicated must not lead us into saying
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that there was no causal relationship to convert. And 
this applies equally well to the causal relationship 
between intending and acting.
It does, admittedly, seem peculiar to say that 
someone did something because he intended to do it in reply 
to the question, "Why did he do it?" This, however, can 
be ascribed to the fact that we do not usually labour the 
obvious; and this amounts to saying that the reply in ques­
tion, although it might be true, is not considered worth 
making. In this respect, such a reply resembles specifying 
that an action is intentional when there is absolutely no 
reason for thinking that it is anything else. In other 
words, in both cases the maxim of the Scandinavian philos­
opher of language H. Tennessen, seems to apply, namely, a 
remark is only remarked if remarkable. And he goes on to 
elaborate, "An unremarkable remark is never in order, it 
is, literally speaking, uncalled for. The natural, stand­
ard, ordinary, usual, everyday response to such an uncalled 
for utterance is .... What do you mean? It doesn't make 
sense". But to repeat myself, it still might be true; and 
as far as we philosophers are concerned, this is the only 
thing that matters here. In other words, we must always be 
ready to distinguish between what it is appropriate or 
inappropriate to say on the one hand and what it is true or 
false to say on the other hand. Indeed, the failure to make
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such a distinction can lead only to a kind of intuitionistic 
linguistics that is no less irrelevant to our purposes for 
disguising itself under the name of philosophy.^
C
In view of what we have just said, we are in a 
position to understand one reason why it has been said, 
mistakenly, in our view, that intentions cannot cause 
actions. And that reason consists in gratuitously assuming 
that because it is peculiar to say something it must be 
false. There is, however, yet another reason, and a more 
profound one, why some are led to deny that intentions 
cause actions. This is connected with the fact that if 
intentions cause actions, the agent's knowledge of what he 
is doing will be inductive knowledge; it will depend upon 
his having observed in the past that his intention of, say, 
writing out a cheque has been followed by the appropriate 
bodily movements. For the effect that a particular cause 
will have can in the final analysis be known only through 
extrapolating from past observations of the former's fol­
lowing upon the occurrence of the latter. And just because
6. Tennessen, H., "Remarking and Remarkability". This paper was read at the annual meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association in Halifax in June, 1964. As far as I know it has not appeared in print.
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one event followed upon another In the past is no sure 
guarantee that It will do likewise in the future. This 
remains true, moreover, no matter how many times before, 
to return to our example, the agent's intention of writing 
out a cheque has been followed by the appropriate bodily 
movements. For example, it may have happened so many times 
before that the agent did not have to look and see in order 
to be reasonably sure in a particular instance that they 
had followed his intention. Still, if he wanted to be per­
fectly sure, he would have to look and see;, and, as a result, 
this would constitute the best evidence available.
All this may strike one on first glance as being 
somewhat strange. This is not to deny that even on first 
glance we can think of reasons why the agent may be unable 
to reply or reply wrongly when asked what he is doing. For 
example, someone may ask him what he is doing and he may be 
unable to reply or he may reply wrongly because of some 
physical impediment or lack of vocabulary. But, needless 
to say, this in itself does not allow us to conclude that 
the agent is not perfectly sure of what he is doing until 
he has looked and seen. Rather, it merely allows us to 
conclude that circumstances exist in which he cannot describe 
what he is doing. And were it not for the physical impedi­
ment or the lack of vocabulary he would be able to describe 
what he is doing. It does, however, on first glance seem
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somewhat odd to maintain that if the agent was writing out 
a cheque and someone challenged him to state on the basis 
of the best evidence available what he was doing, he would 
have to observe his bodily movements or anything else and 
read off what he was doing from them.
I think the oddity stems from a failure to make a 
sufficiently clear distinction between an intention and an 
action. It is true that the agent does not have to observe 
anything in order to be sure of what he intends; although 
we can think of cases where he would have to observe things 
in order to find out what he had intended and then forgotten. 
In other words, the agent has an immediate awareness of, 
although not exclusive access to, his own intentions. And 
this, together with the conative aspect of intending that 
we have already indicated, leads to the viev/ that he has an 
immediate awareness of his own intentional actions. For, 
if the notion of effort is involved in the very notion of 
an intention, then it is only to be expected that the 
immediate awareness the agent has of his Intentions will 
carry over to the effort he makes to do something although 
not to what he actually does. Thus even blindfolded and 
with no sensation in his hand the agent can be immediately 
aware that he intends to write out a cheque and that he is 
trying to do so. On the other hand, he could not know that 
he was actually writing it out unless he used his eyes and
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perhaps his sense of touch,^
To deny this, it seems to me, is to commit oneself 
to the belief that not only intentions but also intentional 
actions are intrinsically mental; for it is the intrinsi-
Qcally mental that the agent is immediately aware of. This 
would mean, however, that what we normally take to be 
actions are not actions at all but merely a series of 
bodily events triggered off by what really is an action, 
namely, an interior event in the mind. Now, I can see no 
good reason to Justify such a view. It seems to depend on 
the assumption that if the agent is convinced that he is 
actually doing something, he must be doing something even 
if it is only something mental. And from this the logical 
leap to saying that even when he actually does something 
the agent at the same time does something mental is not
very great. But this assumption can be shown to be false.
More precisely, as we indicated earlier, the agent can be 
got to agree afterwards that he was wrong in his conviction
and that he had tried and failed. But if he had really
done something, albeit something mental, this procedure 
would be inexplicable.
But how can this be made to square with our pre­
vious contention that the agent is immediately aware of
7. Fleming, Brice Noel, p.311.
8. Fleming, Brice Noel, p.313.
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What he la trying to do? There is really no difficulty 
once we remember that such immediate awareness is asso­
ciated with the notion of trying employed as means of 
expressing hesitation about the outcome of what is being 
done. In this respect it is to be contrasted with the 
notion of trying relevant here where the notion serves as 
a way of describing what the agent has already failed to 
do. It would, however, be quite wrong even in the former 
case to believe that the agent somehow sees with his mind's 
eye an object called a trying that no one else can see. On 
the contrary, his awareness that he is trying is simply 
part of what is involved in his recognizing the disparity 
between what he is tempted to describe himself as doing 
at the time and the state of affairs his doing will bring 
into existence.
Our refusal to accept intentional actions as in­
trinsically mental does seem to correspond with our 
ordinary intuitions. On the other hand, it is not enough 
Just to argue, as we have argued all along, that inten­
tional actions are physical occurrences we come to know in 
the san» way we come to know any other physical occurrence. 
For, needless to say, the notion of a physical occurrence 
is a broad one. As a result, we must make it clear right
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here and now. If it has not been clear all along, that we 
have in mind overt, bodily movements when we speak of 
intentional actions. This is not to say, of course, that 
things like muscle movements and innervating electric cur­
rents from the brain are not necessary conditions of a 
person's doing anything but they are not themselves doings.9 
Incidentally, our refusal to accept intentional 
actions as intrinsically mental should not be interpreted 
as a denial that there are mental acts of an intentional 
nature. Such a denial would be plainly false since we can 
deliberate, do mental arithmetic and the like and these are 
intentional in nature. All we are denying is that inten­
tional actions are mental. And no one, I think, would 
want to dispute that or deny that the distinction between 
acts and actions here drawn is a legitimate one.
D
To change direction for a moment and while we are on the 
subject of the relationship between intentions and actions, 
it has often been remarked, indeed, it is a commonplace, 
that ah intention is an intention to do something. This 
raises the question of whether we could talk significantly
9. Dawes, Hicks, G., "The Nature of Willing", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N.S., vol. XIIÎ, Ï91é-l3.
91
of intentions in a world in which no one could ever do any­
thing. Admittedly, in order for such a question to be 
coherent we should have to make an exception of the act of 
forming an intention or deciding itself; for, while this 
is not an action but a mental act, it can be considered a 
doing in a broad sense of the term. Let us, therefore, 
make an exception of it and go on to pose our question.
Now, for one reason already indicated it would be logi­
cally impossible to speak of intentions in our imaginary 
world since we could not even describe them. This, however, 
is not the reason in which I am primarily interested. I'tore 
positively, I am interested in this regard in the dependence 
of intending on believing. It is this, it seems to me, and 
not the internal logical connexion between intending and 
acting, that renders our imaginary world preposterous while 
at the same time giving us an important insight into the 
nature of intending. The internal logical connexion, on 
the other hand, merely permits us to make a not very profit­
able parallel between intending and thinking since the latter, 
no more that the former, can be identified without reference 
to its object. But with the exception of imperfect inten­
tions, intending to do something is more than simply think­
ing about doing it.
But hov/ does the alleged dependence of intending on 
believing render our imaginary world preposterous? I think
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the best way to answer this question is to ask oneself why 
anyone would form an intention when he firmly believed that 
it would be frustrated. Indeed, to say that it would be 
frustrated in the kind of world we have in mind would be 
to say too much; for such a manner of speaking could be 
relevant only in a world where there existed the possibility 
of success. This condition, however, could hardly be met 
in a world in which nobody could do anything. Admittedly, 
we are assuming that the occupants of such a world would 
be made aware of their congenital incapacity to do what 
they intended. This, in the circumstances, seems a per­
fectly natural assumption to make; for the perpetual frus­
tration of what they intended would eventually convince 
them that in such a world it could not be otherwise. Nor 
does it do any good to resort to the notion of trying and 
maintain that the agent could try to do things in such cir­
cumstances. On the contrary, even in order to try to do 
something the agent would have to believe there was some 
possibility of success, however slight. In other words, 
the notion of trying, although it can be used by the agent 
to express his hesitation as to the result of what he is 
doing, is not compatible with an absolute refusal to believe 
in his ability to bring about such a result.
I think our admittedly imaginary example brings 
out the close connexion between intending and believing.
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More specifically, it shows how the scope of the former can 
be limited by the latter. Now, this is important. Later 
on we are going to defend the non-causal freedom of decision 
and, as a result, the non-causal freedom of intentions. It 
is, however, all too .easy to assume unthinkingly that, if 
decisions are free, the agent somehow enjoys an unlimited 
scope in what he can decide to do. Such an assumption is 
entirely gratuitous but the failure to make this clear has 
rendered the position of the defenders of free-will less 
than convincing in the opinion of many. Indeed, it has had 
the effect of rendering a view of freedom like the one to 
be found in the system of Spinoza more attractive than it 
might have otherwise been. It, at least, has the virtue 
of permitting the notion of belief to play a central role 
in the defence of freedom.
The difficulty with a view of freedom based on the 
intellect and not the will, however, and what renders it 
less satisfactory then the letter, is the model of belief 
it offers. More specifically, it fails to account for the 
fact that believing, although a state of mind, shares many 
of the characteristics of deciding, a form of doing, albeit 
not the most obvious form. For example, what the agent 
believes as well as what he decides is an important factor 
in determining whether or not he is a responsible person.
We can, moreover, in line with this, think of cases where
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he is praised or condemned for what he believes Just as he 
is praised or condemned for what he decides. And this is 
to be at least partially explained by the fact that a per­
son’s beliefs are greatly influenced not only by what he 
has decided in the past but by what he decides right here 
and now. Thus, he might adopt a false belief because he 
has decided not to pay very much attention to the evidence 
at hand. As a result, it is essential to determine whether 
he could have decided otherwise than he did; if we fail to 
do this, we cannot determine whether the limitations imposed 
on the scope of his freedom by his beliefs is, as it were, 
self-imposed or not.
But it is not only the agent’s beliefs that limit 
the scope of his decisions. On the contrary, the role he 
plays in society can be equally effective in this regard. 
Thus, to take Just one example, a person who is not a 
policeman cannot decide to give a man a parking ticket.
This is not to say, of course, that he cannot pretend to 
be a policeman and decide to go through the motions of 
giving him one. This, however, is not the same thing as 
actually being one and actually deciding to give someone a 
parking ticket. This particular limitation on the scope of 
decisions serves to remind us, moreover, that if a respon­
sible person is one who is permanently aware of his obli­
gations those obligations will very often differ funds-
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mentally from those of which another responsible person is 
aware. Indeed, the very notion of obligation cannot be 
adequately understood apart from the particular social 
role of the person who has it.
One last limitation upon the scope of decisions 
that I should like to mention before trying to demonstrate 
the non-causal freedom of decisions themselves is that 
imposed by the agent's lacking the knowledge required for 
a particular decision. More precisely, it is important to 
remember that certain decisions are of a formal nature.
For example, in mathematical logic one speaks of decision- 
procedures that permit one to decide whether a particular 
proposition is valid; and by the same token we can speak 
of a decision-procedure that constitutes the agent’s 
deciding to do something. Thus, in the British system of 
law a Judge at a trial must follow a formal routine that 
constitutes an essential part of his deliberations; and 
the failure to do so, if it is discovered by the proper 
authorities, will void any decision he might have made.
For example, it is, let us say, discovered by the proper 
authorities that a certain Judge decided to sentence a man 
to ten years in prison simply because he felt like it and 
in complete ignorance of the facts of the case. In such 
circumstances, the decision would not only be disregarded 
but it is at least debatable as to whether he would even
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be thought to have made one.^O %n any case, he could be 
asked to make a decision in the case without this implying 
that he had been asked to reconsider a decision already made 
and without this implying that he had been asked to decide 
what he had already decided. The latter request, in any 
case, would amount to demanding the impossible; and this re­
flects the fact that one cannot decide what one has already 
decided, another limitation, albeit a trivial one, upon the 
scope of decision.
10. Or he might be thought at best to have made a decision in a scare-quote sense. For an elucidation of what this means see chapter 3.
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Chapter III
DECIDING AND INTENDING
It Is now time to deal with the question of whether 
or not decisions and, as a result, intentions are caused. 
Immediately, however, we shall have to delimit the notion 
of an intention if we want to speak in the same breath of 
decisions and Intentions; for it is clear that the agent 
intends to do a great many things that have not involved 
his making a conscious decision. I suspect, moreover, that 
the word "conscious” should be stressed here because some 
of these intentions probably involve unconscious decisions. 
Now, the notion of an unconscious decision, like that of 
an unconscious desire, is puzzling at first glance; and, 
as a result, some philosophers have been led to reject both 
notions on the grounds that each constitutes a contradictio 
in adjecto. On the other hand, however, it is a fact of 
everyday experience that people do behave in such a way as 
to lead one to believe that their behaviour is the result 
of some kind of decision even though they are not aware of 
having made one. And this fact of everyday experience 
gains powerful support from the findings of modern psychol­
ogy, Thus, one is t o m  between considerations of semantical
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peculiarity on the one hand and a desire to remain faith­
ful to the facts of experience on the other. The solution 
would seem to be a compromise that countenances unconscious 
decisions while at the same time recognizing that they owe 
their title to their resemblance with certain features asso­
ciated with conscious decision-making. Nor does it matter 
if most or all of those features are behavioural.
It should not be thought, however, that if a par­
ticular intention does not involve a conscious decision it 
must involve an unconscious one. On the contrary, there is 
a perfectly good sense in which the agent can be said to in­
tend to do something even though he has done nothing 
consciously or unconsciously that could be considered the 
making of a decision. This phould not be surprising. We 
are, after all, creatures of habit whose life would be 
rendered excessively complex if we had to come to a decision 
before setting about to do anything. Indeed, one of the 
most important functions of habit is to allow us to dis­
pense with such a procedure. In other words, a decision 
is most typically required when the agent is faced with the 
choice of doing or refraining from doing something out of 
the ordinary or something that does not constitute a part 
of his daily routine. Thus, it is no accident that philos- 
pphers interested in the notion of decision have normally 
concentrated on those decisions that constitute the turning
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point in a man's life and the like. And although this 
kind of approach can degenerate into a kind of philosophical 
melodrama, it is based on an appreciation of the essentially 
dramatic or extraordinary element in decision.
We must, then, delimit the notion of an intention 
so that it will include only those intentions that result 
from a decision if we want to speak of the two in the same 
breath. We shall, moreover, in order to facilitate our 
task, concentrate on those decisions that are of a conscious 
nature. We do this, however, in full recognition of the 
fact that an exhaustive investigation of the nature of 
decision would include a detailed discussion of uncon­
scious decisions. Fortunately, such a full investigation 
is not part of our aim. On the other hand, we cannot ignore 
the fact that in the eyes of some it is only such an investi­
gation that will permit us to get a proper perspective on 
the free-will-determinist controversy. Nor is this neces­
sarily due to an inordinate concern with unconscious deci­
sions, On the contrary, it might be more accurate to 
attribute it to a seemingly inordinate faith in the effi­
cacy of introspection; for we also have in mind those who 
believe that the agent can establish whether or not he 
enjoys a non-causal freedom of decision by inspecting with 
his mind's eye what he does when he makes a decision. More 
specifically, we have in mind a philosopher like Professor
100
C.A, Campbell who Is Interested in those decisions that 
result from an effort of will; and, as far as Campbell is 
concerned, the agent can observe such an effort with his 
mind's eye.1
Campbell has been criticized by Professor P.H.
Nowell-Smith for trying to establish the existence of free­
will in introspectionist terms. The latter contends that 
the dispute between the defenders of free-will and the 
determinist is not a dispute over what the agent sees with 
his mind's eye but over the proper interpretation of what 
he sees in this fashion,^ Now, I believe that Nowell-Smith 
is essentially correct in insisting on the importance of 
interpretation in this context. Indeed, I think Campbell 
himself would agree since his defence of free-will con­
sists in more than a mere reiteration of what he sees with 
his mind's eye. But what he sees with his mind's eye is 
part of it; and Campbell is surely right in believing that 
if there is such a thing as free will the agent should be 
able to observe it in operation. Otherwise, we should have 
to argue that the agent does not experience his own freedom. 
This, however, does not seem to be very different from 
saying that his will is determined tout court. Therefore,
1, Campbell, C.A,, "The Psychology of Effort of Will", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. N.S. VoL
2, Nowell-Smith, P.H., Ethics, pp.280-81.
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in the discussion that follows we must try not to lose 
sight of the fact that we are arguing for a genuine experi­
ence of freedom of the will; and without that our concern 
with interpretation would be meaningless and indefensible. 
As a result, we may regard our task on the interpretative 
level as the essentially negative one of resisting those 
interpretations of the experience in question that consist 
in explaining it away or making it out to be something that 
it is not.
The causal model as applied to decisions does both 
of these things. The difficulty, however, consists in 
trying to establish which candidate to choose as the bearer 
of the causal standard. It is in any case insufficient to 
concentrate on trying to show that motives do not cause 
decisions; for a motive can mean different things. Thus, 
we can speak of the motive as another way of speaking of 
an intention; and there is nothing wrong with this way of 
speaking so long as we remember that an intention qualifies 
as a motive only insofar as it springs, as it often does, 
from a positive desire to do what is intended. Otherwise, 
an intention is not a motive and we must look elsewhere for 
the person's motive in deciding to do X, even though his 
doing X will enable him to realise his intention of doing 
y. In other words, we shall come to the end of our quest 
only when we have established why it is important for him
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to realise his intention of doing Y, which he presumably 
finds boring or distasteful. Secondly, we can speak of a 
motive to refer to things that are often but not always 
taken to be character traits such as ambition, vanity or 
indolence. Finally, it can be used to refer to a desire, 
or a want; and for our purposes there seems to be no reason 
to distinguish between the two. We must, therefore, take 
these different strands of meaning of the notion of a 
motive one at a time if we are not to get hopelessly con­
fused.
The first strand we shall deal with is a motive re­
garded as an intention. We must ask ourselves whether an 
intention can cause a decision. One thing is sure: it can­
not if what is intended is the same as what is decided; 
for it would be absurd to contend that the agent's inten­
tion, say, to write out a cheque caused him to decide to 
write it out. On the contrary, if he already intended to 
write out the cheque, there would be absolutely no point 
in his deciding to do it. This, incidentally, allows us 
to repeat what we said earlier, namely, that it would be 
self-defeating and absurd for the agent, unless he had for­
gotten in the meantime, to decide to do what he had already 
decided to do.
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We must, however, in addition, consider those cases 
where the intention alleged to be the cause of a decision 
does not have the same object as the latter. It might, 
for example, be suggested that the intention to pay a bill 
causes the agent to decide to v/rite out a cheque. But the 
difficulty with this suggestion is that an intention, unless 
it is what we called an imperfect one, entails the decision 
to adopt those means thought to be necessary to its fulfill­
ment. And where there is a variety of means to the fulfill­
ment of the same end with the result that none of them is 
necessary the intention can be said to entail the decision 
to adopt those means thought to be most conducive to its ful­
fillment. It would seem to be the latter kind of relation­
ship that the intention to pay a bill and the decision to 
write out a cheque exemplify. After all, one could decide 
to pay in cash. Thus, if we are correct, the connexion be­
tween the intention and the decision cannot be interpreted 
as a causal one.
But are we correct? First of all, it might be 
argued that at least in what concerns those means thought 
to be most conducive we are seriously mistaken. For, 
surely, a person can intend to do something and at the same 
time decide upon what he takes to be the means the least 
conducive to its fulfillment. This is not to say, of course, 
that people usually behave in this way but it is a fact 
that they sometimes do. Now, I do not wish to deny that a
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person can Intend to do something and at the same time 
decide upon what he takes to be the means the least con­
ducive to its fulfillment. On the other hand, however, I 
think it is undeniable that in such a case the means would 
not be the least conducive from every point of view. Indeed, 
what might seem to be the least conducive from a strictly 
limited point of view takes on a totally different appear­
ance when we are informed of some of the other and more pro­
found intentions that the person has. Nor should this be 
surprising. On the contrary, it would be surprising if it 
were otherwise since we should be forced to conclude that a 
person could intend to do something and decide upon what 
he took to be the means the least conducive to its fulfill­
ment for no reason at all. And this, I suggest, would be a 
totally puzzling state of affairs.
To rephrase, then, our original contention: if an 
intention entails the decision to adopt those means thought 
to be necessary to its fulfillment or, at least, those 
means, given the person's whole battery of intentions, 
thought to be most conducive to its fulfillment, it follows 
that the connexion cannot be interpreted as a causal one. 
There is, however, another line of argument that 
might be developed against our position. What we have in 
mind is really an argumentum ad hominem since it consists
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In showing that our present position is inconsistent with 
one we adopted earlier. More specifically, it consists in 
showing that if, as we have maintained, the relationship 
between an intention and an action is a causal one there 
is no reason to think that the relationship between an 
intention and a decision is not a causal one, too. It is 
important to remember at this point, however, that, despite 
our insistence on the causal nature of the relationship be­
tween intending and acting, we did agree on the logical 
nature of the relationship between intending and being ready 
to take the steps thought necessary to its fulfillment.
Now, these two separate and distinct relationships, the 
one causal and the other logical, are transformed into 
two logical relationships once we substitute decisions for 
actions in the first relationship. This is to be explained 
by the fact that there is a logical connexion in the new 
set of relationships thus acquired between being ready to 
take the steps thought necessary to the fulfillment of an 
intention in the one relationship and deciding to take them 
in the other which does not exist in the old set of rela­
tionships between being ready to take the steps thought 
necessary in the one relationship and actually taking them 
in the other. This logical connexion allows us to say 
that an intention, in entailing the readiness to take the 
steps thought necessary to its fulfillment as it was seen
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to be in the second relationship, does by the principle 
of transitivity entail the decision to take those steps in 
the first relationship. In other words, the readiness to 
take the steps presupposes the decision to take those steps, 
when a decision to that effect is actually made.
B
What of a motive for action where we have in mind 
a character trait such as ambition, vanity or indolence?
Can they cause decisions? Philosophers like Ryle have main­
tained that they cannot cause anything because they are not 
occurrences but dispositions,3 we tried to argue earlier, 
however, that, over and above the ways in which it predis­
poses the agent to act, a disposition is a property of the 
agent in a categorical sense or a part of his J]nature",
On the other hand, a clear distinction must be drawn between 
something that causes the agent to make a decision to per­
form some action and something that predisposes him to make 
a decision to do something. In the latter case it simply 
bestows upon him a disposition to make certain kinds of 
decisions. Thus, if it be ambition, the agent will be
3. Ryle, Gilbert, pp,83-115,
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disposed to decide in a manner that will further his ca­
reer and so on. This, however, has no causal implications 
since he could have so decided even though he had shown no 
previous disposition or tendency to decide in this way and 
could not be considered ambitious. After all, Ryle to the 
contrary, people can and do act out of character. This 
seems to show, moreover, that when we speak of the agent's 
motive for having decided as he did we need not be explain­
ing the decision by reference to his character.
It might be said against this that a man can be 
temporarily ambitious. This leads to difficulties, how? 
ever, because a man who is temporarily ambitious is not 
expected to do all the things that a man who is dispo- 
sitionally ambitious is expected to do. As Foot has 
indicated, in order to mjke this model of explanation 
cover a sufficiently wide range of behaviour we should have 
to stop talking of temporary dispositions and concentrate 
on such descriptions as "a boastful mood", "a savage frame 
of mind", or "a fit of bad temper",^ Incidentally, this 
makes clear one of the reasons why a human disposition does 
not have its analogue in, say, the brittleness of a piece 
of glass; for glass, even when it is only temporarily 
brittle, is expected to have all the reactions that a 
permanently brittle piece of glass has.
4. Foot, Philippa, p.447.
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It Is In fact Ryle's desire to assimilate motive- 
explanations to the piece-of-glass-breaking-when-the-stone- 
hit-it-because-it-was-brittle model that leads him astray, 
htore specifically, this encourages the belief that state­
ments like, "Jones decided to court the daughter of his 
employer because he was ambitious" or "Jones decided to 
make himself prominent in such and such a Situation because 
he was vain" are examples of something's being explained 
by the assigning of a motive to it Just as the glass- 
breaking is to be explained by the fact that the glass is 
brittle. In reality, however, if they are regarded in this 
way, they can be seen to be totally innocent of explana­
tory force; for deciding to court the daughter of one's 
employer is Just acting out of ambition and deciding to 
make oneself prominent is Just acting out of vanity. As a 
result, it is only to be expected that the function of these 
two statements is not to assign a motive to an action but 
to relate a particular act of ambition and a particular act 
of vanity to a character trait. And they fulfil this 
function very well but it is not the explanatory function 
they are often thought to have.
In what, then, does the assigning of a motive for 
an action consist when the motive in question is a character
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trait? I do not think that there is one, all-encompassing 
answer to this question. On the contrary, several things 
can count as assigning a motive for an action. Thus, very 
often it is merely to sketch out in general what the ascrip­
tion of an intention fills in in detail. For example, to 
assert that Jones decided to assume the role of vice- 
president of his firm because he was ambitious can be fil­
led in by the further assertion that he decided in that way 
because he believed it to be a necessary step to his becom­
ing president of the firçi. And as we have already had 
occasion to note, it is not in this sense that a motive can 
be said to be a cause of a decision; for in this case the 
intention to become president of the firm is logically 
related to the decision in question.
Not all motives when they are character traits, 
however, are like ambition which might be called a forward- 
looking motive because it involves a further state of affairs 
as an end in view. Remorse, for example, is what might be 
called a backv/ard-looking motive because it involves some­
thing that happened in the past or, at least, something 
believed to have happened in the past as a ground for action. 
Here in the assigning of a motive for a decision the empha­
sis is not on the sketching out of an intention, although, 
admittedly, an intention is involved. And it has nothing 
to do with the assigning of à cause. On the contrary, to
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know that the agent has decided on a course of action 
because he feels remorse results from filling in certain 
additional details of the decision itself; and this is to 
be distinguished from knowing how the decision came to be, 
the kind of knowledge that a causal explanation would give 
us. Thus, we should talte it that the agent’s motive for 
deciding to do such and such was remorse if we discovered 
that what he decided was to beg someone's forgiveness for 
a wrong he believed he had done to him. For, in discover­
ing this, we should have discovered what the deciding was 
done as and discovering this is an essential part of 
discovering what was being done.
This suggests a distinction that might be drawn 
between explaining something in causal terms and under­
standing something by discovering additional character­
istics v/hich it possesses. Of course, it is true that some­
thing's being caused is a characteristic of the thing, but 
this meaning of "characteristic" can be waived in the 
interests of our distinction. It becomes, moreover all the 
more legitimate if we remember that it is made in other 
areas of discourse. Thus, Freud and his disciples have 
often been criticized for emphasizing the causal ante­
cedents of certain kinds of mental aberration at the expense
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of the "phenonenologioel" or purely descriptive espects of 
these eberretlons. Now, whether or not this criticism is 
justified is of no immediete interest to me. What is of 
interest is that such a criticism pre-supposes and can only 
be understood in terms of our distinction. And this 
renders the latter more plausible. Indeed, unless it is 
that some people have been so impressed with the success of 
causal explanations in the empirical sciences that they have 
been blinded to the virtues of pure description of phenomena, 
one is hard pressed to explain why the distinction is so 
often overlooked at least in the philosophy of action.
It is, incidentally, no accident that we es^loyed 
the notion of remorse in providing an example of a backward- 
looking motive; for remorse, like responsibility, can be 
rendered coherent only on the assumption that there is non- 
causal freedom. More specifically, there would be abso­
lutely no reason for the agent to feel remorse for an 
action he performed unless he had reason to believe that 
he could have done otherwise. Nor do I mean by this that 
he could have done otherwise if he had decided differently. 
In most oases he could but that is not from our point of 
view very important. What is important is to establish 
whether he could have decided differently. For, if he
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could have decided differently, then he could have done 
otherwise In a sense of that phrase that la of interest to 
a proponent of free-will. Now, it might be advanced that 
he could have decided differently if the causal antecedents 
of his decision had been different. This, of course, is 
the position of the determinist who refuses to attach any 
other intelligible meaning to the phrase "could have decided 
differently". He is, however, mistaken in his refusal since 
it leaves unexplained why the person should feel remorse 
for what, in the final analysis, was brought about by fac­
tors over which he had very limited or no control. For it 
would seem to be undeniable that at most only a relatively 
small number of the alleged causal antecedents would be of 
his making. It would, moreover, be self-defeating and 
absurd to attribute remorse to such an agent unless one 
were convinced that he did believe he could have done other­
wise in the required sense of that phrase; for the act of 
attributing such a quality to him would of itself testify 
to such a conviction and render any scepticism on that count 
incoherent. This is not to say, of course, that there is 
no such thing as irrational remorse. For, it is clear, the 
agent may blame himself for having struck a pedestrian with 
his automobile when in the circumstances he could not have 
avoided it; and although we could quite well understand his 
feeling immensely saddened by this event, we should probably
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consider ourselves to be on good logical as well as humani­
tarian ground in convincing him that he need feel no remorse. 
On the other hand, if we satisfied ourselves that in having 
struck the pedestrian the agent was merely carrying out his 
decision to do so, we should feel no urge to convince him 
that he need feel no remorse. On the contrary, his failure 
to feel remorse in these circumstances would probably deeply 
offend odr moral sensibility; and if it did not, it would
isay more about us than the nature of the deed.
A determinist, however, is committed to viewing re­
morse as something irrational. And this remains true even 
though only a relatively small number of determinists, of 
whomc Spinoza is the most notable, have explicitly recog­
nized this fact. The only alternative to the Spinozistic 
approach would seem to consist in regarding remorse as some­
thing the agent is taught to feel by others as a means of 
influencing his future behaviour. Now, it is, I think, 
undeniable that a person who genuinely feels remorse for 
what he has done is also convinced that if he had it to do 
over again he would now act differently. Indeed, even if 
he did not have to do it over again but had something to 
do that was similar to it in relevant respects, he would still 
be convinced that he would act differently. In this respect, 
remorse differs from regret since the agent can regret a de­
cision even though he would do the same thing over again if
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he could or would decide In the same way In similar circum­
stances, For example, having decided upon the career he is 
to follow, the agent may at times regret the decision he 
made and still be convinced that he would do it again if 
he could. This, however, does not permit us to regard 
remorse as something purely utilitarian in nature. On the 
contrary, the conviction on which the utilitarian character 
of remorse depends, namely, the conviction that if he had 
the action to do over again he would now act differently, 
depends upon his belief that he could have acted differ­
ently from the way he acted in the past. For, if he did 
not believe that he could have acted differently in the 
past, there would be no reason for him to believe that any­
thing of importance would be changed in this regard merely 
by the passage of time. That is to say, there would be no 
reason for him to believe that in the absence of new causal 
factors, over which he had very limited or no control, he 
could in the final analysis act differently in the present 
from the way he did in the past.
There is yet a third kind of motive as a character 
trait to which in the final analysis backward-looking mo­
tives may be assimilated. And here again the assigning of 
this kind of motive for a decision has nothing to do with
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assigning a cause and much to do with giving a fuller 
description of the decision itself. In saying that this 
third kind of motive, for which, unfortunately, we do not 
have a special name, is of such a type that backward- 
looking motives may be assimilated to it, I may be taken to 
have in mind backward-locking reasons-for-deciding. This, 
however, would be a mistake. More specifically, it would 
be to overlook the fact that a motive for a decision must 
contain within itself a reference to the objective in terms 
of which the decision is made or, to put it another way, 
that for the sake of which the decision is made. Thus, 
although a person may decide to borrow money because he has 
lost his Job or decide to remain a bachelor because he 
sub-consciously hates his mother, neither of these is a mo­
tive for his decision. This is not to say, of course, that 
the former is not his reason for his decision and that the 
latter is not the reason for his decision where the reason 
is to be opposed to his reason or the reason the agent him­
self would give. But it is to say that neither of them is 
a motive. And although motives are a species of his-reason 
for-deciding, they are not co-extensive with the class of 
his-reasons-for-deciding.
Incidentally, the fact that a motive for a decision 
must contain within itself a reference to the objective in 
terms of which the decision is made tells against the
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Rylean identification of a motive with a disposition. For
the agent may decide in the way, say, a patriotic person
would decide and yet we still might refuse to allow that
his motive for deciding in that way was patriotism. On
the contrary,
it is still open to us to ask what was his motive for so acting. His actions are quite consistent with his wanting to gain kudos or his having his eye on the post-war political scene; and they are also consistent with hiswanting to help his country,^
And needless to say, only in the last case mentioned would 
the motive be patriotism.
But what is the third kind of motive as character 
trait that we have mentioned? It can be best introduced by 
referring to two examples of it, I am thinking of the mo­
tives of jealousy and love. Now, these are not backward- 
looking motives because they do not involve something at 
least believed to have happened, if it did not actually 
happen, as a ground for action. On the contrary, the 
Jealous person is generally prompted to decide in the way 
he does by something he believes to be taking place now 
and the lover loves the beloved at least in part for some 
quality or set of qualities the latter is believed to pos­
sess now. And the enphasis is not upon an end in view that 
the agent intends to bring about even though this will be
5. Nowell-Smith, P.H., p.126,
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involved if Jealousy and love are to be motives. On the 
other hand, however, backward-looking motives and motives 
like those of Jealousy and love have, as we have already 
indicated, much in common. More specifically, both help 
us to understand why a decision to do something that is 
not in itself attractive nor a means to something that is 
attractive may yet be taken. Thus, out of a feeling of re­
morse the agent may decide on a course of action that he 
finds from every point of view utterly boring and out of 
Jealousy he may decide upon a course of action that he 
would normally find quite distasteful. And these are both 
to be contrasted with a forward-looking motive like ambi­
tion where, to use our example again, the agent decides 
to assume the role of vice-president of his firm as a nec­
essary step to becoming president of the firm, a position 
he finds attractive.
D'Arcy, quite rightly, includes a sense of duty in 
the class of motives constructed out of the class of 
backward-looking motives and motives that involve something 
going on or existing now.^ For a sense of duty or a sense 
of moral obligation also helps us to understand why the 
agent may decide to do something that is not attractive in 
itself nor a means to something that is attractive. It, 
too,reveals the presence of an external circumstance in the
6, D'Arcy, Eric, pp,155-56.
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absence of which the agent, as a human being, would not be 
expected ,to decide as he does.
We must, however, be on our guard against over­
stating the case. The agent who decides on a course of 
action oulT of remorse. Jealousy, a sense of moral obli­
gation and so on may find something attractive in acting 
in this way. There is, after all, a certain satisfaction 
to be derived from making amends for an action for which 
one feels remorse, from fulfilling one's moral obligation 
or from harming someone of whom one is Jealous, But all 
we are maintaining is that these actions need not be 
attractive in the eyes of the agent before he will decide 
to perform them. And this remains true in spite of the 
contention of some philosophers that the agent cannot 
decide to perform an action unless he finds it in some way 
attractive or unless he believes that it will serve as a . 
means to some end that he finds in some v/ay attractive.
Or, what amounts to the same thing, it remains true in 
spite of the contention of some philosophers that the agent 
cannot decide to perform an action unless he desires to per­
form it. Fob I take it that the agent will normally desire 
to do what he finds to be in some way attractive. But I 
shall deal with this contention later especially as it re­
lates to the sense of moral obligation.
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Before going on to consider desires as possible 
causes of decision, I want to say a final word about mo­
tives as character traits. It is true, as certain philos­
ophers have had occasion to point out, that very often we 
ask for the motive behind a decision when we suspect that 
the decision was made for a peculiar reason. And very 
often we ascribe a motive for a decision either to confirm 
the suspicion that the usual reason for such a decision is
7not at work or to reject the suggestion that it is not.' 
Thus, we should not normally ask why Jones decided to call 
a doctor when his wife was very ill because there seems to 
be nothing strange about this decision and the reason for 
making it seems obvious. On the other hand, we should 
normally ask why Jones decided to call a doctor if it 
turned out that Jones was stone-deaf and, as a result, 
could not hear a word the doctor said or if it turned out 
that his wife had only a very slight headache and Jones 
was apprised of this fact.
I am not, however, as impressed as some philos­
ophers seem to be by this characteristic of the situation 
in which we normally ask for a motive. For, if we make 
this a necessary condition of intelligibly asking for the
7. D'Arcy, Eric, p.l4l.
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agent's motive for a decision, we become susceptible to 
the charge of having arbitrarily limited the circumstances 
In which we can Intelligibly ask for a motive to those In 
which the suspicion that something remarkable or unusual 
Is taking place happens to arouse our Interest. And such 
a procedure Is no more Justified here than It was In the 
case of Intentional actions where, as we saw, one might be 
tempted to say that Intentions do not cause their correspond­
ing actions because there Is so little that Is remarkable 
in this fact. There, too. It seems to be assumed that a 
cause, like a motive, can be intelligibly asked for only 
If one suspects that something remarkable or unusual is 
taking place. Indeed, Insofar as motives and causes play 
fundamental roles in explaining things philosophers who 
adopt the procedure In question may be taken to be saying 
that explanations of things out of the ordinary precedes or 
accompanies thegi. Thus, It Is not surprising to find D ’Arcy, 
who does adopt the procedure in question, at least as far 
as motives are concerned, saying that, ’’One does not explain 
an action by mentioning something which Is already known as
Qits natural associate,” But the fact remains that In a 
perfectly acceptable sense of ’’explanation” its natural 
associates do explain an action Just as the natural asso­
ciates of a stone's falling explain its falling. In like
8. D'Arcy, Eric, p.l4l.
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manner the natural associate of an action such as the Inten­
tion to perform It may cause It and the natural associate 
of a decision may be its motive.
All this remains true despite the fact that In the 
absence of at least the suspicion that something remarkable 
or unusual Is taking place It would be strange to ask for 
the agent's motive In deciding in such a way or the Inten­
tion behind his action. Or, to put It another way, the 
strangeness, oddness or even, from the ordinary point of 
view, meaninglessness Involved in asking such a question 
does not mean that such a question is in any way logically 
unintelligible. On the contrary. Its making logical sense 
is a necessary condition of one's being able to find It 
strange or odd.
But let us return to the main business at hand which 
Is to establish whether or not motives cause decisions.
S\ Thus^ far In our discussion of motives as causes of deci­
sions we have failed to dwell on the one that Is most fre­
quently mentioned In this regard. I am thinking of a mo­
tive viewed as a desire. Broad, for exan^le. In the process 
of criticizing the view that the Moral Law has a kind of
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causal efficacy —  precisely what kind Is of no immediate
Interest to us here —  maintains that what people really
mean when they say this Is that
...... Smith's belief that a certain alter­native would be In accordance with the Moral Law and his desire to do what is right, were cause-Factors In the total cause which determined his puttlng-forth of effort on the side of that alter­native. Now this belief was an event, which happened when his conative emo­tional moral dispositions were stirred by the process of reflecting on the alter­natives.9
Leaving aside what Broad has to say about belief 
and applying what he says of desire to decisions, we can 
see that he regards the former as events that are cause- 
factors In the latter. And In line with the ordinary, 
everyday practice of converting a causal factor Into a 
cause tout court, we can, without doing violence to the 
text. Interpret Broad, for all Intents and purposes, as 
saying that a desire Is a cause of action; and the action 
In this case Is that of deciding to do something. Now, It 
seems to me undeniable that a desire can be an event If only 
In the sense that It can be an Isolable occurrence whose 
tlme-span can In principle be estimated. This Is not to 
say, however, that all desires are like this. On the con­
trary, very often the criteria for the application of the 
description, ’’Smith desires to do such and such” or ’’Smith
9. Broad, C.D., p.132.
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desires such and such” are purely behavioural. In this 
respect doing something out of desire resembles doing some­
thing Intentionally. But Just as some Intentional actions 
are Intended, so, some actions performed out of desire are 
actually preceded by a desire.
There Is, however, another objection to treating a 
desire as an Isolable occurrence, and this again recalls the 
notion of an Intention, More specifically, the objection 
Is that a desire, like an Intention, cannot be an Isolable 
occurrence because it cannot be described without reference 
to what Is desired. Now, it is important to understand 
that even If this were true. It would exclude as possible 
causes of decisions only those relatively rare desires that 
had decisions for their objects. Thus, It would exclude the 
agent's decision, say, to write out a cheque from being 
caused by a desire so to decide, but It would not exclude 
its being caused by his desire, say, to buy a mink coat.
But Is It true that a desire cannot be an Isolable occur­
rence? I think not: the mere fact that there Is such a 
logical connexion between the concept of a desire and Its 
object does not show this anymore than the mere fact that 
there Is such a logical connexion between the concept of 
an Intention and Its object shows that an intention cannot 
be an Isolable occurrence.
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Before going on to give our reasons for denying 
that a desire can cause a decision, let us dwell for a 
moment on an argument proffered by Foot and which purports 
to Justify the same negative conclusion. This argument, 
incidentally, unlike the one with which we Just dealt, has 
the advantage of stressing desires where their objects and 
their alleged effects are not identical. Foot is inter­
ested in the phrase ”H wants” insofar as it means that the 
agent would adopt a certain course of action if there were 
no reason for not doing so. She continues:
We can say, ”He wants to get to London,” even when he is not prepared to take the necessary steps to get to London, pro­vided he can say ’’Trains are too expensive,” or ’Hitchhiking is too uncomfortable. ” If we offered him a spare railway ticket or otherwise disposed of his reasons against going, and he still did not go, we would have to say, ”He didn't really want to go after all, ’ So wanting In this sense is being prepared to act under certain con­ditions, though not being prepared to act- under the given conditions. It is a de- - scription which could be applied to a man before we knew whether he was ready to act In a given situation, and It seems that there might then be a causal relation be­tween the wanting and the acting where the latter took place. This iâ quite true; there could be a law to the effect that when the description ’’He wants x” applied at _t 2^, the description ”He is "taking the necessary steps to get x” applied at t 2.It would be possible to spy this without making a mistake about what it is to want and Inventing a hidden condition of body or mind. One could say, ’’WcLitlng in this sense
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Just is being prepared to act under some conditions,” and still maintain that there could be an empirical law connecting want­ing with acting under a particular set of conditions. The mistake lies not in the Idea that such laws are possible but in the thought that there Is a reference to them in the statement that a man did one thing because he wanted something else.l^
This, if I interpret it correctly, is a bad argument. 
And my reason for spying this Is not that Is assumes the 
rejection of an event-analysls of desires; although It does 
assume this. Rather, It Is that the argument does scant 
Justice to the type of analysis that Foot herself seems to 
think has an Initial plausibility. For It Is surely not 
enough to admit the possibility of an empirical law con­
necting wanting with acting under a particular set of 
conditions as Foot does and, then, seemingly at least, to 
deny that there actually Is one merely because there Is no 
reference to It In the statement that a man did one thing 
because he wanted something else. Indeed, this kind of 
argument Is to be compared In Its Inconclusiveness to the 
one employed very often against the philosophical material­
ist who maintains that consciousness is logically identi­
fiable with brain processes. More specifically, the argument 
Is that such an Identification Is Impossible because when vie 
speak of states of consciousness we do not mean to refer to 
brain states. And the appropriate reply to It In my view Is
10. Foot, Philippa, pp.444-45.
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that someone might refer to the morning star without meaning 
to refer to the evening star and yet they are one and the 
same star. Of course. It was by empirical means that the 
morning star was discovered to be the same star as the 
evening star; but there Is nothing the matter with a logi­
cal Identity that Is discovered by empirical means. Con­
sequently, consciousness Is not shov/n to be uhldentlflable 
with brain processes simply because we can refer to the one 
without meaning to refer to the other, Nor Is wanting 
shown to be unconnected with an empirical law connecting It 
with acting under a particular set of circumstances simply 
because we do not mean to refer to such a law when we refer 
to wanting,
11
I trust the reader has not concluded from the above 
that I am willing to argue In favour of philosophical 
materialism, Nothing could be farther from the truth since 
the latter Is incompatible with the non-causal freedom of 
decision that we are seeking to defend; for If consciousness 
were Identifiable with brain processes, conscious decisions 
would a fortiori be Identifiable with them and they would 
be causally determined in the same way that brain processes 
are. Or If "causally determined” Is too strong a phrase to
11, Smart, J.J.C,, "Sensation and Brain Processes”, The Philosophical Review, LXVIII, 1959, pp.141-56,
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be employed In this context, we might say that they would 
be subject to the same statistical correlations as brain 
processes.
But, how, we might be asked can we be sure that this
is not the way things are? I think we have the beginning
of an answer once it is seen that if we could not be sure 
we should have to allow for the possibility of the agent's 
knowing what he was going to decide to do before he actually 
decided, ftore specifically, if the agent's desire to do 
such and such caused him to decide to do it, there would be 
no reason in principle why he could not infer his decision 
from his desire. Nor does it do any good to object that 
in such a case the inference itself might constitute such 
a reason. For although it is true that the agent's infer­
ence that a certain desire would result in a certain deci­
sion might give rise to a desire to frustrate the first one,
this could happen only if the first desire was not in
reality causally efficacious. We are, however, concerned 
only with those desires that are supposed to be causally 
efficacious and it matters little whether it happens to be 
the original desire or the desire to frustrate it. All 
that matters is that there should be one desire that is 
causally efficacious and that the agent should know that 
it is. And despite the fact that any desire, including the 
desire to frustrate the original one, might give rise in its
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turn to a desire to frustrate It seems undeniable that 
we should finally reach a point at which the agent would 
not desire to frustrate another one of his desires. Now, 
wherever this point might be, once reached, the agent would 
be in a position to infer his decision from his desire.
Indeed, in the normal course of events the agent would act 
upon either his original desire or the desire to frustrate 
it in particular and thus stop the process. Moreover, there 
is little doubt that he would have to do this if he were to 
accomplish very much. At the same time it should not be 
thought that when we have reached the point at which the 
agent does not desire to frustrate another one of his desires 
his lack of desire itself constitutes a desire. Such a 
state of affairs would, on the contrary, be entirely para­
doxical since it would permit us to introduce another desire 
that would frustrate the desire constituted in some strange 
way by the lack of desire. The result would be that we 
should never come to an end to the process of desiring and 
counter-desiring and the agent would never accomplish any­
thing.
It is true, of course, that at this point we are 
assuming that the agent can decide to do such and such only if 
he desires to do it. In following this procedure, however, 
we are merely accepting. In order to facilitate the argu­
ment, one of the assumptions of those who maintain that
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desires cause decisions. This is, moreover, in keeping 
with our original procedure of considering each candidate 
for the cause of decisions, be it an intention, a motive 
or a desire separately. On the other hand, however, I do 
not think that much would be changed, even if we considered 
the candidates in concert. For we should still have to 
reach a point where the agent acted on whatever it was that 
moved him to act and, if it moved him in a causal way, he 
could in principle predict this.
Incidentally, none of this commits us to denying 
that the agent might in some situations find it hard to 
detezTnine exactly what he desired, but there seems to be 
no reason for saying that this state of affairs could not 
by any stretch of the imagination be overcome. And even if 
it could not, it would remain true that the agent does in 
most cases know what he desires. Indeed, if he did not, it 
is doubtful whether we should have the concept of desire 
that we now have. Instead, desiring to do something would 
come to resemble, say, the preliminary stages of cancer; 
and instead of asking the agent what he desired, we might 
ask him to submit to an examination in order to find out 
just as a medical doctor asks a patient to submit to an 
examination in order to find out if he had cancer.
Granted that the agent in most cases knows what he 
desires, what, it might be asked, is the matter with his
130
knowing beforehand what he la going to decide to do? The 
answer is that the two are irreconcilable. After all, why 
should anyone go to the trouble of deciding when he already 
knew what he would decide? Such a procedure, while it 
would not necessarily be self-defeating, like a perform­
ative contradiction, would be otiose and, therefore, absurd. 
For, if he knew beforehand what he v;as going to decide, an 
essential element in coming to a decision would be absent, 
namely, the passage from uncertainty to certainty as to 
what he would do. And, needless to say, a distinction must 
be drawn between the agent's being certain of what he is 
going to do and what he actually does do. Otherwise, we 
shell have to face the objection that there is no such 
passage from uncertainty to certainty involved in coming to 
a decision for the simple reason that no one can ever be 
certain that he will actually do what he decides. There is 
always the possibility that he will change his mind or that 
empirical obstacles will get in his way.
il
But to return to the question of whether the agent 
can know beforehand what decision he is going to make. 
Another objection to our line of argument might rest on the 
simple fact that we do talk as though we could know what 
decision we are going to make. Mr. J.W. Roxbee Cox makes
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much of this fact and provides the following examples to 
show that It Is a fact:
?) ”I have found that when I come up to the city from my home, and consider where to have my dinner, I always end up by going to a French restaurant. I have no doubt that that is what I shall decide to do when I am in town next week."
2) ’’Although I think one should not drink before driving, I know that 1*11 be persuaded as usual and agree to have a glass of whisky after the meeting.”
3) ’’Everyone I know with young children ends up buying a television set. I haven't though^much about the pros and cons, but I'm sure I'll end up by deciding to get one.”
4) ’’I've no real desire to get married at all. But I know that after he has asked me again and badgered me, I shall give in.”
5) ’’Playing correspondence chess, I decide on my next move after long thought, I do not intend to send it off until next week, X know that by then I shall have forgotten what I have decided; but I also know that I shall decide on the same move when I consider the question again.”12
It is important to notice the essential irrelevance of
Cox's fifth example. For here it is not a question of the
agent's knowing beforehand what he will decide but merely
of his knowing beforehand that, whatever his decision is,
it will be one that he had made and then forgotten. And
12. Roxbee Cox, J.W., ’’Can I know Beforehand What I amGoing to Decide”, The Philosophical Review, LXXI, 1962, p.89r
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it is his having forgotten that makes all the difference: 
if he had not forgotten, there would be absolutely no need 
for him to make another décision. Indeed, if it were the 
same decision except for its being distinct from the first 
one, it would be logically impossible for him to make it 
since one cannot decide what one has already decided.
But what of Cox's other examples? It seems to me 
that in some of them he is trading on the open-textured 
quality of ordinary language. Now, one example of this 
open-textured quality is the fact that we often say we know 
something or have ho doubt of something and at the same 
time leave open the possibility of our being wrong. Thus, 
in the first, third and fifth of Cox's examples we could 
well imagine the speaker's entertaining some doubt as to 
what he would de despite what he had said. On the other 
hand, there is a perfectly acceptable and quite familiar 
use of "know" where such doubt would normally be paradoxical. 
I am thinking of that sense of "know" where one is justified 
in saying that one knows only if one's grounds are conclu­
sive, In other words, one is not in a position to say that 
one knows in this sense unless one's grounds are of such a 
nature that they give one the right to disregard any further 
evidence. Nor does this necessarily mean that one's grounds 
are so strong that they logically imply that what one claims 
to know is true. On the contrary, as Hintikka indicates.
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"It may merely mean that the grounds one has are such that 
any further inquiry would be pointless for the normal pur­
poses of the speaker of the language."13
Cox, then, fails to distinguish between the two 
senses of "know" and it leads him into seriously over­
estimating the import of some of the examples he offers. 
More specifically, he is led into believing that the agent 
can know what he is going to decide beforehand when, for 
what I take to be the primary sense of "know", he has not 
ahd cannot show this. Nor is the failure to distinguish 
between the two senses of "know" the only shortcoming in 
Cox's approach; for in none of the examples he offers is 
it really clear whether the speaker is claiming to knov; in 
advance what he will decide or what decision already made 
he will announce at the appropriate time. Thus, in the 
first example, v/e could quite easily interpret the speaker 
as claiming to know what decision he will announce when he 
comes up to the city the next time. And the same is true 
to a greater or lesser degree of Cox's second, third and 
fourth examples.
This distinction between making a decision and 
announcing it can also be made in terms of informal and
13. Hintikka, Jaakko, p.20.
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formal decisions. Thus, in Cox’s first example, there is 
a sense in which the speaker cannot be said to have decided 
where to have his dinner until he has said as much. That 
is to say, there is a sense in which something can count 
as a decision only if it constitutes what the late Professor 
J.L. Austin called a performative u t t e r a n c e . I n  other 
words, in this sense, deciding, like promising, consists in 
uttering the appropriate verbal formula in the appropriate 
circumstances. the other hand, however, deciding differs 
from promising in having an informal counterpart which 
allows us to say that a person has decided to do such and 
such even though he has not said anything to that effect.
And the informal and formal kinds of deciding are intimately 
related if only because the agent usually utters the appro­
priate verbal formula only after having come to a decision 
"in his heart". Indeed, if it were otherwise, the utterance 
of the appropriate formula would soon lose any significance 
it might have had. But fortunately, this does not happen 
because, as a matter of fact, a decision to utter the for­
mula is usually based upon or connected with a decision 
made"in one’s heart”. In other words, the decision announced 
and the decision "in one's heart" have the same content. It 
is, however, important to see that the utterance of the ver-
14. Austin, J.L., "Performative Utterances", Philosophical Papers, edited by J.O. Urmaon and G.L. Warnock, pp.èèô-
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bal formula is itself usually based upon a decision; and 
this is why the agent can be said to know in advance that 
he is going to utter it.
There is yet another distinction that Cox fails to 
make. This is the distinction between the agent's alleged 
ability to know beforehand what he is going to decide and 
his inability to admit to himself that he decided what he 
has decided. Now, the second and the fourth examples that 
are relevant to the present discussion can both be inter­
preted as examplifications of this inability. Or, to put 
it in a slightly different way, they can both be inter­
preted as exemplifications of what M. Jean-Paul Sartre has 
called "la mauvaise foi" or in English "bad f a i t h " . A t  
the risk of over-simplifying the matter, I should suggest 
that bad faith is a species of insincerity; and what makes 
it parx;icularly interesting is that it is insincerity towards 
oneself. Thus, in Cox's fourth example, which even more than 
the second one lends itself to this interpretation, the wo­
man may be guilty of insincerity. She may have already 
decided to marry the man and yet, for various reasons, want 
to convince herself that she has not yet decided but will
15. Sartre, J.-P., "La Mauvaise Foi", L*Etre et le Néant, pp.84-111.
136
be forced to decide against her will. To this end, she 
seeks to regard herself, as it were, as an object whose 
reactions can be known in advance and thus be predicted. 
But, of course, she is not an object, but an agent, and in 
predicting what she will be badgered into deciding she is 
really announcing her decision. And whether we say that 
it is a decision to marry the man or a decision to permit 
herself to be badgered into marrying him will make very 
little real difference.
15
Thus far we have been criticizing Cox for failing 
to make several important distinctions in proffering the 
examples where the agent says that he knows beforehand what 
he is going to decide. But what if Cox had made these 
distinctions and had still insisted that the agent could 
be said to know what he is going to decide beforehand in 
what we can now see to be the relevant sense of that expres­
sion? Is there any way of showing that he would be wrong 
or must we simply depend upon our ordinary intuitions? I 
think there is a way of showing that he would be wrong; 
and this depends on the assumption that a person who was 
alleged to know what he was going to decide beforehand 
could not seriously be taken to be in a state of indecision. 
On the contrary, he would be decided on the course of action
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he was going to pursue. Nor does this assumption beg the 
question at issue of whether or not the agent can know 
beforehand what he is going to decide; for he can be decided 
on a course of action without actually having made a deci­
sion to that effect. Indeed, being decided, like being 
certain, relates primarily to the agent's state of mind 
and only secondarily to how he got into that state of mind. 
And Just as the agent's being certain of what he was going 
to decide to do would, as we indicated earlier, be incom­
patible with a genuine decision, so, his being decided 
would be incompatible with his still having to decide what 
to do. But it could not be considered incompatible if the 
agent knew beforehand what he was going to decide. There­
fore, it cannot be true that the agent knows beforehand 
what he is going to decide,
16
Let us anticipate one possible objection. We are 
not suggesting that the agent makes a decision in order to 
pass from a state of uncertainty about what he w^ ill decide 
to a state of certainty about what he has decided. Simi­
larly, we are not suggesting that he makes a decision in 
order to be decided. On the contrary, both these states 
of mind are simply the inevitable consequences of any deci­
sion to do something. But if they had to be intended, then
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it would be possible to think of instances where they were 
not intended and where decisions were made without their 
accompanying or following upon them.
II
There is a more serious objection to be considered; 
and this has to do with an assumption behind the procedure 
we adopted. We have proceeded on the assumption that a 
determinist could not admit the impossibility of the agent's 
knowing his decision beforehand. He is not, however, 
strictly speaking obliged to do this. More positively, he 
could agree that it is impossible for the agent to know 
beforehand what he is going to decide; and then he could 
go on to point out that as a matter of fact the agent is 
seldom in a position to know beforehand what he is going 
to decide. As a result, he might contend, even if deci­
sions are caused, the agent can still make them so long as 
he is in ignorance of some or all of the causal factors in­
volved, Moreover, even where he is not in ignorance of the 
causal factors involved, we can only conclude that what 
were sufficient causal factors are sufficient causal factors 
no longer. But this does not mean that a new set of causal 
factors cannot take its place in bringing about a decision. 
Thus, he might conclude, we have not refuted his position 
although we might have said something interesting and true
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about the relationship between deciding and knowing.
The trouble with this argument is that it fails to 
take into account the practical implications of determinism 
regarded as a general principle; for I should want to argue 
that a decision would be pointless if the agent could know 
that it was caused even though he did not know what the 
specific cause was. Thus, if we are concerned with a deter­
minism of desire, I should want to maintain that a decision 
would be pointless if the agent could know his decision 
would be caused by any desire whatsoever. Indeed, the sup­
posed cause would not even have to be a desire to bring about 
this state of affairs. It could be an intention or a motive 
or something else. And insofar as it could be the first two, 
what we are about to say can be interpreted as an additional 
criticism of the view that they cause decisions. But let 
us concentrate on desires. It should not be surprising that 
a decision would be pointless if the agent could know his 
decision would be caused by any desire whatsoever; for it 
surely is a common enough belief, shared by the agent, that 
if a decision is to count for something it must, to use a 
colloquialism, "be up to him". Moreover, as an adjunct to 
this there is the belief, also shared by the agent, that if 
the decision were not up to him this could only be because 
the matter had already been "decided" one way or the other 
for him. And by this I do not mean here to refer to the
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belief that the agent himself would necessarily be decided 
as to what course of action to follow but that any decision 
he might make would merely put a rubber stamp on the 
causally efficacious desire. In other words, one would come 
to realise that decisions are otiose and pointless and, in 
the interests of economy, one would be tempted to eliminate 
them altogether,
18
There are at least two kinds of reply that the deter­
minist might be tempted to make to our criticism of his 
position. The first, and the more promising one, would be 
to the effect that the causal efficacy of the desire works 
through the process of deciding; as a result, if the agent 
did not go through the process of making a decision he might 
very well act differently from the way he would if he had 
gone through such a process. That his going through this 
process or his failure to do so was itself causally deter­
mined v/ould not, it hardly needs saying, make any real dif­
ference to the question at hand.
I think we should first of all notice what the 
implications of this line of argument would be for the 
nature of deciding itself. It is, I think, undeniable that 
it forces us to regard decisions as something the agent 
makes in order to do what he desires. Or, at least, it
I4l
would be hard to discover any other rationale in these cir­
cumstances for the process of decision-making. And here I 
am assuming that the agent is au courant of what, if the 
determinist is to be believed, decisions really are. As a 
result, he is not at all tempted to over-estimate the impor­
tance of decision-making as those who believe in the freedom 
of the will supposedly are. Now, in such a situation we 
should be able to envisage a case in which the agent, 
although he desires to do such and such, does not desire it 
enough to go to the trouble of making a decision in order 
to render his desire efficacious. In other words, we 
should be able to envisage a case in which the agent decides 
not to decide. For, at least on some occasions his not de­
siring it enough to go to the trouble of making a decision 
would result in his deciding not to go to the trouble of 
making a decision. If, moreover, we should be able to en­
visage this, we should also be able to envisage a case in 
which the agent does decide to go to the trouble of deciding. 
The truth of the matter, however, is that we can envisage 
neither one. Indeed, it is impossible to know exactly what 
it would mean to engage in either one of these activities; 
and matters are not helped by the fact that both of them 
give rise to an Infinite regress. On the other hand, we are 
not, it hardly needs saying, suggesting that the difficulties 
described arise when it is a question of deciding noty make a
A.
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formal decision or deciding to make this kind of decision. 
But, then, it is not this kind of decision that the deter­
minist has in mind here.
It is considerations of the kind we have just 
treated that Mr, Richard Taylor might be thinking of when 
he insists that decision-making and determinism are incom­
patible and rejects, as we do, the rejoinder that a desire
or whatever can work through a decision.. As he puts it in
a rather rhetorical passage where he talks of deliberation 
instead of deciding:
It is no good here, incidentally, to introduce such vague and familiar slogans as "Deliberation might, after all, be a natural process," or "Deliberation is only the way some perhaps paychological,. causes work themselves out," and so on. If such remarks are unpacked, and "natural processes" are found to be nothing but causal chains,and "causes" are understood to be causesof the usual kind —  namely, antecedent con­ditions, psychological or other, which are sufficient for, and thus render inevitable, whatever it is that they cause -- then far from being rejoinders to what has been said they only Illustrate something that is pain­fully well known; namely, that philosophers, no less than the vulgar, are perfectly capable of holding speculative opinions that are in­consistent with some of their own beliefs of common sense.
Oddly enough certain determinists have thought that 
such a consequence could be denied simply by affirming that 
they are both determinists and makers of decisions. In
16. Taylor, Richard, "Deliberation and Foreknowledge", American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 1, 1964, p.77.
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this respect, they remind me of those philosophers who 
affirm that they are solipsists and make a sincere effort 
to convince others that they should be solipsists too; hr 
to give another example, they remind one of those sceptics 
who assert that we cannot really know anything, not even 
that we cannot really know anything. In all three cases, it 
seems to be assumed that showing a view to be held by one­
self, especially if one happens to be a philosopher, is a 
guarantee of its consistency. But this, of course, is 
absurd and does not merit serious attention since the 
philosopher, no less than the layman, is not immune from 
inconsistency; and the mere fact of being aware of an incon­
sistency does not make it any less .an inconsistency.^"^
ii
Another difficulty with the determinist reply under 
consideration is that it distorts the decision-making pro­
cess, For to make everything depend upon a desire, even a 
desire working itself through a decision, is in the final 
analysis to give weight to the desire and to nothing else.
The result is that the weighing of the pros and cons involved 
in deciding cannot, as we ordinarily tend to think, have any 
influence upon the weights themselves; it can only register 
the weights as they already are. Indeed, on this view,
17. Taylor, Richard, p,77.
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insofar as decision-making Involves a form of activity, it 
consists purely and simply in a registration of weights; and 
it should not be forgotten, even if a desire works itself 
through a decision, the latter is a distinct form of activ­
ity, But to assimilate decision-making to a registration 
of weights is to ignore the difficulties and hesitations 
arising from the fact that the agent has often to decide 
whether or not to accept those weights at their face-value. 
For, although the agent may not have direct control over 
the content and force or weight of his desires, it is hard 
to believe that the process of deciding itself cannot some­
times constitute a kind of counter-va^ing force of its own. 
At any rate, if it cannot, it becomes very hard to under­
stand why we persist in thinking that the agent has a truly 
creative role to play in the decision-making procedure as 
opposed to that of someone who merely registers what is 
already there.
But, it will be asked, in what can this creative 
role consist? Or, better still, in what can the counter- 
v^ing force of a decision consist? There is, it hardly 
needs saying, no easy answer to this question. Indeed, I am 
not at all sure that the question is not mal pose from the 
beginning since it seems to assume that a decision cannot 
provide this counter-v^ing force from its own resources but 
must depend on something else. And right away the notion of
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desire comes to mind, but It could Just as well be a number 
of other things. On the other hand, however, if we did not 
have recourse to something external to the decision in 
order to account for the force with which it is provided, 
this force seems to be rendered inexplicable. But in this 
regard the same is true of this notion as was seen to be 
true of the notion of an active being of v/hich it is only 
in reality another example. That is to say, we know that 
it is for a decision to have a force of its own because we 
are essentially beings who make decisions. As a result, 
although no explanations or, at least, no non-circular 
explanation of the notion in question is possible, neither 
is it necessary.
This is, I fully realise, to make the position of 
those who would defend freedom of the will depend at a 
crucial point upon the distinction between the agent and 
the spectator. This is not surprising. Indeed, it seems 
to be the only way to explain the acerbity and the futility 
of so many of the encounters between determinists and pro­
ponents of the freedom of the will. For what seems incompre­
hensible and totally obscure to the former seems obvious and 
ineluctable to the latter. On the other hand, however, it 
is hard to believe that the incomprehensibility and obscu­
rity that the determinist bemoans in the position of those 
who would defend freedom of the will is not theory-laden.
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whatever the theory might be. Otherwise, the difficulties 
and distortions involved in his approach to the making of 
decisions are hard to understand. For, after all, one can­
not help but observe that he made decisions long before he 
was a determinist.
But lest we forget, there is, as we have already 
noted, another kind of reply that the determinist might 
make to our criticism that he renders decisions otiose and 
pointless, or, to put it slightly more positively, that he 
converts them into rubber stamps for causally efficacious 
desires. More specifically, he might reply that rubber 
stamps serve a purpose. Thus, it might be argued that, as 
a kind of rubber stamp, the agent’s announcement of his de­
cision serves as a way of giving others his word or author­
ity for saying that he is going to do such and such. In 
other v/ords, on this view, the already mentioned difference 
between deciding and announcing a decision is minimized if 
not abolished and decisions are seen to be a kind of per- 
^  formative utterance on the same order as promising or taking 
a vow. And to those of us who express our reluctance to 
accept such a view it might be suggested that we are commit­
ting the descriptive fallacy. We are assuming that the 
only function of language is to describe things and, as a
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result, we confuse doing something by uttering certain 
obvious ritual phrases with describing what is being done.
There can be little doubt of the attractiveness of 
this view for the determinist. For, if it is true, it 
allows him to assign a significant role to the notion of a 
decision without even having to allow, if he is at all 
reluctant to do so, that deciding is a process over and 
above desiring. Indeed, on such a view, deciding is not a 
process at all excepting insofar as uttering a form of 
words may be described in this way. Unfortunately, how­
ever, for the determinist, the view cannot be sustained.
First of all, the refusal to allow any significant distinc­
tion between deciding and announcing a decision is, as our 
earlier remarks on this score were meant to show, a per­
fectly gratuitous one. And secondly, even if we were to 
allow the determinist to run roughshod over a significant 
distinction in this way, he would still have to explain 
why the decision to announce a decision would not on his 
view be otiose and pointless.
21
It will be urged that we do sometimes want to say . 
that a decision has been made even when it is obvious to 
everyone that it has been caused. For example, no one 
would want to deny that a person in the grips of an obsession
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or a person acting under some internal compulsion can some­
times be said to make decisions. It, then, however, becomes 
important to explicate the sense in which this is true. Now, 
it seems to me that this is true only in what might be called 
a "scare-quote" sense of deciding. And this brings us back 
to the metaphor of the rubber stamp; for Just as we might be 
inclined to say that Elizabeth II ’’ruled” Great Britain 
because, among other things, her seal of approval must be 
got for any new legislation, so, one would be inclined to 
say that the obsessive compulsive who ’decides” to wash his 
hands for the fiftieth time that day ’’decides” only in the 
sense that he gives, as it were, his seal of approval to 
what has in another sense already been decided.
The analogy with the Queen’s seal of approval can, 
moreover, be sustained in another way. More specifically, 
the ritual that the Queen goes through in giving her seal 
of approval to new legislation is to be compared with the 
ritual of deciding that the obsessive compulsive acts out. 
That is to say, the latter might wrinkle his brow, scratch 
his head, go through a process of weighing the pros and cons 
and so forth but not in any truly significant sense come to 
a decision. Nor is this peculiar to such extreme cases as 
that of the obsessive compulsive. On the contrary, it 
would seem to apply to all of those cases in which what is 
alleged to be a process of deciding what to do fails to re-
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suit in the agent’s being decided. Thus, it is only by 
courtesy that we should allow someone to have made a deci­
sion when we knew that his decision did not terminate his 
indecision; the person who can never make up his mind on a 
certain matter may decide first in this way and then in that 
way and yet never really decide at all. Indeed, "making up 
his mind" is the key phrase here and I should suggest that 
it follows upon any real decision.
But let us return for a moment to our obsessive com- 
puslive, who seems on first glance to be so ideally suited 
to the needs of the determinist. What is often over-looked 
when it is said that such a person's decisions are caused 
is that in many cases he does not make a decision at all.
And by saying this I mean to exclude the ^scare-quote^ sense 
of deciding as well. If, for example, we assume that our 
obsessive compulsive was trying to resist the temptation to 
wash his hands for the fiftieth time, then it would hardly 
do to say that his failure to resist constituted a decision 
to this effect on his part. On the contrary, by his 
attempt to resist he would probably get himself into such 
a frantic state that in the end he would lose all control 
and make a dash for the wash basin. On the other hand, how­
ever, this is not to deny that his attempt to resist may not 
have the effect of a delaying action. Indeed, insofar as 
the attempt to resist, as opposed to the failure to resist.
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is itself the result of a decision, this is a case in which 
the decision of an obsessive compulsive is something, al­
though not much, more than a rubber stamp. But the fact 
remains that his failure to resist would leave no place in 
which the notion of a decision could get hold.
Incidentally, if what we have said here is true, it 
can easily be adapted to tell against one of the things Mr. 
R.M. Hare has to say on the subject of moral weakness, of 
v/hich he seems, if I interpret him correctly, to regard 
obsessive compulsion as an extreme example. Thus, Hare 
seems to think that the morally weak man will always an­
swer the question, "What shall I do?" in a way that con­
flicts v/ith his sense of moral obligation and then go on 
to act in such a manner. This, at any rate, is how I inter­
pret the following passage where I have underlined the most 
relevant portion.
It is therefore not a consequence of our account of the matter, which stresses the impossibility of resisting the temptation, that the morally weak man is exempt from adverse moral Judgment. In terms of the preceding chapter, the question ’What shall I do?* arises for him as it does in the case of physical lng>ossibtltty; and even if we can be sure that he will answer it in a certain way it may nevertheless be of value to say that he ought not to act so, in order to assert the general prescriptiveprinciple.18
In reality, however, if the weak-willed person gives any
18. Hare, R.M., Freedom and Reason, p.80,
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answer to this question it is likely to be of such a kind 
that it does not conflict with his moral obligation and 
can thus serve as a kind of delaying action Just like a 
decision to this effect. In other words, it is not what 
he says but what he does that is in conflict with his sense 
of moral obligation as a general rule, although there are 
exceptions. And it is this disparity between saying and 
doing that makes the notion of moral weakness so interesting. 
If, on the other hand. Hare v/as right in believing that it 
is in the nature of the case both what the weak-willed per­
son says and what he does that are in conflict with his 
sense of moral obligation, then it would be impossible in 
all cases, and not Just in an exceptional few as matters 
now stand, to distinguish between the weak-willed person 
and the evil-willed person. Or, to continue with what we 
said earlier in a context where we emphasized what the per­
son intends instead of what he says, a weak-willed person, 
instead of failing to carry out his intention, would, on 
Hare*3 view, succeed in doing what he intended. And since, 
on this same view, he would intend to act in such a way as 
to flout his sense of moral obligation, there would be no 
significant difference between him and the evil-willed per­
son, But this, one hardly needs to be reminded, is for the 
great majority of cases simply not true.
But to return to our obsessive compulsive, it would
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seem, then, that the obsessive compulsive either decides to 
do things only in a "scare-quote" sense of the term that can 
at best constitute a delaying action or he does not decide 
to do things at all, And from this it follows that any 
attempt to assimilate conduct in general to the pattern of 
conduct exemplified by the obsessive conpulsive must re­
sult in one *s holding that we must talk of decisions in the 
scare-quote sense or not at all. Nor does it do any good 
here to insist that the determinist need not attempt to 
assimilate the two patterns of conduct. For such a view 
could be sustained only if it had been shown on determinist 
grounds that, whereas what the obsessive compulsive does 
is independent of his decision, the decision of a normal 
person has an appreciable influence on what he does. But 
this not only has not been shown but it completely ignores 
what vre said a little earlier about the difficulties the 
determinist encounters in trying to outline a sense in 
which the decision of a normal person can have an appre­
ciable influence on what he does. This is not to say, of 
course that the determinist cannot find other points of 
dissimilarity between the obsessive-compulsive and the nor­
mal person. As far as decisions are concerned, nowever, 
the dissimilarity, I must confess, escapes me as soon as I 
assume along with the determinist that decisions are caused. 
And nothing that had been said so far has served to enlighten 
me on this matter.
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If what we have said Is true, those philosophers like 
Professor John Hospers who maintain that all decisions In 
the final analysis are determined by the unconscious must.
If they are to be consistent, abandon the notion of a deci­
sion as we know I t . îforeover, the onus Is upon them to 
prove the truth of what to most of us seems manifestly false, 
namely, that the way most of us decide what to do differs In 
no essential respects from the way the obsessive compulsive 
decides. And It Is not enough to do as Hospers does and
make an appeal to what practising psychoanalysts would say
20since this merely provokes one to question Its truth.
But what If someone were to stoutly affirm that no 
one ever really makes a decision? Admittedly, this must 
strike the layman and even the determinist in his non- 
phllosophlcal moments as paradoxical and this In Itself 
would seem to constitute a good reason for rejecting the 
doctrine. But let us look at it a little more closely, 
anyway. First of all, however, we should make It clear 
that we shall not try to disprove the doctrine in ques­
tion. Indeed, I do not think it can be disproved that
19. Hospers, John, "Free-Will and Psychoanalysis", Readings In Ethical Theory, edited by Wilfred Sellars and John Hospers, pp.586-575.
20. Hospers, John, pp.574-75.
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people do not make decisions anymore than It can be dis­
proved that they do not sometimes sit on tables and chairs. 
At least, this Is true If the evidence of common-sense and 
everyday experience have been, rejected from the beginning 
as they have been here. But to return to the business at 
hand. There Is something curious In the fact that the 
determinist would want to deny that anyone ever makes a 
decision to do something and yet presumably does not want 
to deny that he makes a decision as to what Is the case.
In other words, the question arises as to whether there 
can be decldings that unless there are decldlngs to. Now,
I think It would be to over-state the case to maintain that 
the existence of the former Implies the existence of the 
latter. At the same time, however, the two have more in 
common than the determinist seems to realise. For example, 
there is a marked similarity between the evidence for 
deciding that such and such Is the case and a reason, be 
it in the form of a desire or not, for deciding to make it 
be the case. For example. In both cases an appeal to 
evaluative terms like "good", "bad", "strong" and "weak" 
is relevant. On the other hand. If I am not mistaken, 
these terms are not ordinarily employed when we give our­
selves over to the language of causality. Indeed, It Is 
hard to know what could be meant by describing a cause in 
such terms. But we know very well #hat is meant when it Is 
a question of evidence or reasons because, unlike causes.
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both are evaluated In terms of standards or criteria. In 
other words, the agent has to weigh the evidence In the one 
case and the reasons in the other. And this is a highly 
sophisticated and conplex process in which he contributes 
at least as much as he accepts.
Against this it might be objected that there Is a 
perfectly acceptable sense In which a cause can be said to 
be adequate even if it Is not described as "good", "bad", 
"strong" and "weak". As a result, the objection continues, 
there is grounds for believing that a cause can be evaluated, 
since this is an evaluative term, in the same way as a piece 
of evidence or a reason. Now, It is true that we can speak 
of a cause as being adequate to its effect. But this does 
not constitute an evaluation of the cause. On the contrary, 
it is merely to contribute to the definition of the notion 
of causality itself. In other words, here, the term 
"adequate" is not being employed for the purposes of evalu­
ation at all. Indeed, it could not be otherwise since a 
cause that is adequate to its effect will bring about that 
effect whatever our evaluation of the cause might be. And 
this distinguishes a cause from the evidence leading to a 
decision that such and such Is the case and from a reason 
leading to a decision to make such and such be the case.
Incidentally, nothing in what we have said about 
these two kinds of decision. It hardly needs saying, amounts
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to denying that there is an important difference between 
deciding that such and such is the case and deciding to 
make such and such be the case. The former, as it has al­
ready been remarked, is bound in a very intimate manner to 
the evidence believed to be available for it. In fact, so 
close is the connexion that one is tempted to deny even the 
relevance of the agent's desires, here a species of reason, 
to this kind of decision; for, it might be suggested, here 
what one desires to be the case and what the evidence leads 
one to decide to be the case are two very different things. 
This, however, is an over-statement. It not only overlooks 
the subjective element that all too often enters into our 
seemingly objective decisions, but, more important, it over­
looks the obvious fact that what a person desires is often 
very good evidence for his deciding that such and such is 
the case. For example, the fact that the person desires to 
drink all the time might constitute good evidence for his 
decision that he has diabetes. On the other hand, however, 
it is clear in this case that what the person decides to be 
the case and what he desires are two different things. As 
a result, there can be no question here of his desiring 
constituting a reason for his decision as opposed to con­
stituting evidence for it.
23
But, surely, it will be argued, whatever the case
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may be, the comparison between deciding that such and such 
is the case and deciding to make such and such be the case 
is of dubious value from our point of view. For, even if 
the criteria in terms of which we call evidence good or 
strong do not define the notion of a decision, still, once 
the criteria for such evidence are thought to be satisfied 
the decision that such and such is the case will ordinarily 
follow upon it. But this, it will be suggested, cannot be 
true of a reason for deciding to make such and such be the 
case since, otherwise, the decision would not be free. In 
other words, we are being put on our guard against sub­
stituting what might be called a determinism of reasons for 
a determinism of desire.
It seems to me, however, that the warning is unneces 
sary; and the failure to see this results from regarding the 
agent's reasons for deciding to do such and such as some­
thing external to him and as something that somehow is im­
posed upon him. Indeed, the view in question is only a 
more general version of the externalist view of the moral 
"ought". As such, it Involves the same difficulties. More 
particularly. Just as the agent can intelligibly ask why he 
should decide in accordance with a moral "ought" imposed 
from the outside by, say, a divine law-giver, so, he can 
intelligibly ask why he should decide in accordance with a 
reason suggested to him by someone or something else. On
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the other hand, once the agent has satisfied himself that 
the reason is a compelling one, he can no longer intelli­
gibly ask why his decision should be governed by it. It 
has now become his reason and is no longer something external 
to him. And the same is true of the moral "ought",
I think, moreover, that the externalist view of rea­
sons for deciding, if consistently followed through, leads 
to an assimilation of the agent's reason for deciding to a 
cause. This is so because a cause is usually thought to be 
external to the agent, itius, we talk of the cause and not 
of his cause. Now, if such an assimilation were acceptable, 
we should, I think, find that we could talk interchangeably 
of the cause or the reason; and we should attach little im­
portance to the expression "his reason". Indeed, that is 
Just what we do find in the literature of psychoanalysis 
where causal determinism is presupposed from the beginning 
and where the reason the patient sincerely gives for his 
decision is thought to be insertant only insofar as it helps 
one to discover the reason. Such an approach in my view, 
however, is tenable only if we are willing to renounce the 
notion of man as a rational being; for, if we are uhwilling 
ever to take the agent's reason for a decision at its face- 
value, then in a significant sense we are refusing to treat 
him as a rational being.
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It will no doubt be objected that the term "rational" 
can be employed In several different ways. Thus, It might 
be suggested that on one Interpretation of the term "ration­
al" even a person In whom the disparity between what he takes 
to be his reasons for deciding on a course of action and the 
real reasons Is chronic could be said to be rational. But 
this could only mean that he was, like everything else, sub­
ject to the laws of nature and, in this sense, even a stone 
can be said to behave rationally. Or, to put it in another 
way, all that Is being said here Is that both the unfortu­
nate person with whom we are dealing and the stone behave 
in a way that permits of rational explanation; and this Is 
to be opposed to the Inexplicable occurrence of a random 
event, whatever that would be. Thus, In the final analysis 
It Is the explanation of the occurrence and not the occur­
rence Itself that we have In mind when we speak of ration­
ality In this context. And, needless to spy, a causal 
explanation does qualify as one type of rational explanation.
But not the only type. It has, however, been the 
belief that It is the only type that accounts for the con­
fusion between a causally free decision and a random one.
Such a confusion Is Implicit In passages like the following:
Par from "free-will" being a necessary foundation of morality "free-will" would make
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all morality, of the kind we know and the "free-will"-ists want, absolutely impossible.The central condition of moral life is res­ponsibility. So central is it, that it is now acknowledged as such in all the penal codes of civilized countries. But, if man has, instead of a determinate nature, "free-will" responsibility can In no way be fixed. Edu­cation, too, is necessarily impossible. Hence all punishment would have to be retributive.Moral strife, as well as legal penalties, would bear all the stigmata of unmitigated, imbecile cruelty. This is not the case how­ever if man has an absolutely determinate nature. Education Is possible. And there­fore although crime loses none of Its evil character, punishment can lose all of Its In­human sting. The necessary condition of human morality is responsibility not Irresponsibility; reliability not unreliability; certainty not uncertainty; a firm will, not a "free" will,
Now the confusion of thought that this passage exemplifies 
hardly requires comment. Indeed, one can only reflect on 
the irony of the fact that we resisted the temptation to 
which some philosophers have succumbed to deny that a causal 
explanation is In the final analysis a rational explanation 
at all. For It has been argued by some that a causal expla­
nation is not really an explanation at all and a fortiori 
not a rational explanation. Professor W.T. Stace, for example, 
argues for this position, as can be seen In the following 
passage.
Cold solidifies water. Cold Is the cause (or part of the cause); Ice Is the effect. But It Is Impossible to see why cold should cau^e solidification. The cause and effect do not resemble each other in any way, nor can one see any connection between them. That
21. % e  Philosophy of Spinoza, Selected with a Life of Spinoza and an Introduction by John Ratner. The quotation Is from p. XII of the introduction.
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cold solidifies water is an unexplained and mysterious fact which nobody could possibly foresee. For anything one could predict to the contrary, cold might just as well turn water into steam. 22
Nor is Stace failing to take account in his argument of our 
ignorance of intermediate causes. On the contrary, as he 
points out himself, the same difficulty would arise with re­
gard to cold and some intermediate cause as arises with cold 
and solidified water. On the other hand, however, I am not 
sure Stace is not overstating the case when he contends 
that a reference to causes does not explain anything. In­
deed, such a contention verges on the paradoxical. In any 
case, the fact remains that a causal explanation of a gen­
uine decision, even if it were possible, would be less 
satisfactory than the corresponding explanation in terms of 
the agent's reasons for deciding. And it iâ less satis­
factory for the reason Stace gives. Thus, it is ironic 
when some philosophers, obsessed with the causal model of 
explanation, refuse to regard an explanation of a decision 
in terms of the agent's reasons as an explanation at all.
In terras of what we have Just said we can now ask 
ourselves what kind of explanation is an explanation of a 
decision by reference to the agent's desires? Is it a
22. Stace, W.T., The Philosophy of Hegel, p.51.
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causal one or does a desire constitute a reason for de­
ciding in such and such a way? It is clear, I think, that
most typically a desire constitutes a reason for deciding
to act in such and such a way. This, however, is not
always the case since, as our example of the obsessive-
compulsive illustrated, a person can be the victim of his 
ov/n desires; but in this case the decision is a decision 
only in the "scare-quote" sense of the term. On the other 
hand, we must not say with some philosophers that a desire 
is the only reason for deciding on such and such a course 
of action. This is a mistake that has been made by philos­
ophers from Hobbes to Nowell-Smith; for the latter's sub­
stitution of "pro-^attitude" for "desire" does not change 
anything of substance.^3 Furthermore, it is a mistake that 
lends a certain plausibility to determinism and it is no 
accident that philosophers like Hobbes and Nowell-Smith are 
determinists. And by this I do not mean that the one mis­
taken view entails the other. But I do mean that the first 
view makes it easier to slide into the second since philos­
ophers seem to have found it relatively easy to make the 
fatal leap from saying that a desire is the only reason for 
deciding to do such and such to saying that a person is 
always more or less a victim of his own desires.
In order to prevent this from happening one has only
23. Nowell-Smith, P.H., pp.111-116.
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to keep in mind reasons for deciding on a course of action 
that have little or nothing to do with desires and do not 
allow themselves to be confused with causes the way desires 
do. For example, there is little temptation to say that a 
decision arising out of one's awareness of one's moral obli­
gations is a decision only in a "scare-quote" sense because 
one's awareness of one's moral obligations is a cause as 
opposed to a reason.
It might be objected that the agent would not be 
swayed by his awareness of moral obligation unless he de­
sired to be so swayed. And this might be given as evidence 
that in the final analysis desires are the only reasons for 
deciding. This objection, however, in my viev/, is entirely 
misconceived. More specifically, it rests upon an ambiguity 
in the notion of desire. Thus, the agent may decide on a 
certain course of action because he has a positive desire 
to follow that course of action and he may say as much; 
and here there can be no doubt that the desire constitutes 
a reason for his decision. On the other hand, to speak of 
a desire, especially when the agent displays little enthu­
siasm for v/hat he is about to do, is often Just another way 
of speaking of the interest he must take, no matter hov; 
slight it may be, in the action before he will decide to 
perform it. As a result, whén we are told, as we often are, 
that the agent's awareness of obligation must be supplemented
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by a desire to do what he takes himself to be obliged to 
do before he will actually do it, we are really being told 
that such awareness must be accompanied by an interest in 
doing what he takes himself to be obliged to do before he 
will actually do it. And it is only on this interpretation 
that we can account for the analytic nature of the dictum 
that the agent decides to do only what he desires to do; 
for it amounts to saying that the agent decides to do only 
what he is not totally indifferent to doing. Nor can there 
be much doubt that the dictum, as it is usually interpreted, 
does become an analytic truth.
26
Incidentally, if what we have said is true, it might 
go some way towards solving a paradox that a great many 
moral philosophers have posed for themselves. The paradox 
briefly is this: on the one hand it seems true that the 
agent cannot base a decision on his sense of obligation 
unless he desires to do so but, on the other hand, this 
seems to imply that all reasons for deciding must be inter­
ested ones not merely in the sense that the agent is not 
totally indifferent to performing the action in question but 
in the sense that they are intimately connected with what 
he takes to be his own good. And this is just another way 
of saying that in the final analysis no one ever has a purely
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moral reson for deciding to do what he does decide. Nov/, 
a great many moral philosophers, quite rightly I think, 
have balked at accepting a conclusion which implies that 
"morality needs an external sanction." But such a reaction 
seems inconsistent with accepting the viev/ that the agent 
cannot base a decision on his sense of obligation unless 
he desires to do so. Nor does it really solve the paradox 
to introduce a desire to base a decision on a sense of 
obligation purely because one has a sense of obligation.
For, although in this way one could argue that not all 
reasons for deciding are, at least in any obvious sense, 
interested, it would remain true that no one ever has a 
purely moral reason for deciding to do what he does decide.
Or, to put it in a slightly different way, interested rea­
sons and moral reasons for deciding do not exhaust the 
possibilities since the desire to decide on the basis of 
one's sense of obligation is both disinterested and non- 
moral.
But how are v/e to explain the persistence of the 
conviction that there are purely moral reasons for deciding? 
How are we to explain the deep-seated belief that such a rea­
son is good and sufficient and requires no external support?
I think the reason why we mistakenly think that there is 
something to be explained here is that we fail to notice 
that "desire" is being used equivocally. For it is trivially
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true that the agent cannot base a decision on his sense of 
obligation unless he desires to do so where desiring to do 
so is equivalent to being not totally indifferent to per­
forming the action in question. On the other hand, however, 
if we mean something more than that by our use of "desire", 
then, clearly, it is false to say that the agent cannot 
base a decision on his sense of obligation unless he desires 
to do 30. On the contrary, what he takes himself to be 
obliged to decide and what he desires to decide might 
actually conflict. And to deny this is to deny an obvious 
fact.
21
Before leaving this question, I think we might 
point to a difficulty that those moral philosophers find 
themselves in when they try to resolve the conflict between 
obligation and interest in the sense of what the agent 
takes to be his own good by an appeal to a desire to base 
a decision on a sense of obligation purely because one has 
a sense of obligation. The difficulty is that if we make 
an appeal to such a desire we shall have to admit the pos­
sibility of conflict between it and the desire to decide in 
accordance with what one takes to be ohe's own good. And 
there seems to be no reason not to treat such a conflict as 
an open question to be resolved by means of a decision. On
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the other hand, however, there seems to be something 
peculiarly inappropriate in speaking of a decision in this 
context. For one wants to say that when the agent sincerely 
acknowledges that such and such a decision is in accordance 
with his sense of obligation and when he is not entirely in­
different to the performance of the action involved he has 
already in effect made the decision; and if this is true, 
his being in a state of indecision here is quite irrational, 
Let me anticipate an objection, I am not denying 
that the agent can on occasion acknowledge such and such a 
decision to be in accordance with his sense of obligation, 
be not entirely indifferent to the performance of the action 
involved and yet refrain from making the decision. That is 
to say, I am not denying that the agent can suffer from 
weakness of the will and the like. But is is important to 
see that it is weakness of the will and, as such, an excep­
tion to the rule; for no one, I take it, would want to 
maintain that weakness of the will is not an abnormal con­
dition. On the other hand, however, I am denying that in 
the normal course of events the agent can sincerely acknow­
ledge a decision to be in accordance with his sense of obli­
gation, be not entirely indifferent to the performance of 
the action involved and yet leave open the question of 
whether or not he will make that decision. And I could
24, Falk, W.D., "Ought and Motivation", Readings in Ethical Theory, edited by Wilfred Sellars and John Hospers, ppTW-510.
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understand a denial of this denial only as a roundabout 
way of saying that he did not sincerely acknowledge the 
decision to be in accordance with his sense of obligation. 
As a result, I conclude that, insofar as the appeal to a 
special desire to decide in terms of one's sense of obli­
gation would allow us to take this denial of a denial at 
its face value, it must be a mistaken procedure.
169
Chapter IV
FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY: A CONCLUSION
For a long while now we have been arguing that deci­
sions and by Implication intentions are not caused. And we 
have thought it necessary to argue for this position in 
order to defend the non-causal freedom of intentional actions. 
Now, right away someone might object that the non-causal 
freedom of decisions is not enough to establish a correspond­
ing freedom of intentional actions. More positively, he 
might argue that in addition the relationship between an 
intention and an action would have to be shown to be a non- 
causal one. But since we have argued that it is a causal 
one, we should, on this view, be misdescribing what we have 
been doing in claiming to have argued for the non-causal 
freedom of intentional actions. I think, however, that in 
this case the problem is more than anything else one of 
definition. More specifically, it is a problem of defining 
the criteria in terms of which we can say that an inten­
tional action is non-causally free. And as such it is not 
a problem of determining whether our description of what we 
have been doing is true or false; for this will depend upon 
the criteria for an intentional action that re are employing.
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It might be suggested, in the light of what we have 
Just said, that we should examine the adequacy of the com­
peting criteria in terms of which we can say that an inten­
tional action is non-causally free. The difficulty with 
this suggestion, however, is that it would require us to go 
too far afield. There might, for example, be reasons of a 
systematic nature that lead one to insist on being shown 
both that intentions and the actions rising out of them 
are uncaused before allowing that intentional actions are 
non-causally free. Or it might Just be a matter of defining 
the notion of a non-causally free intentional action in this 
way in accordance with an "intuition". And in both cases 
it would be an analytic truth that a non-causally free in­
tentional action would be characterized by both the inten­
tion and the action being uncaused. The only difference 
would be that In the former case some attempt could be made 
to Justify treating it as an analytic truth while, apart 
from the "intuition" itself, no such attempt could be made 
in the latter case. This, however, should not lead us to 
overlook the fact that even in both cases we should have to 
be prepared to consider more than Just the notion of a non- 
causally free intentional action. And since we are not pre­
pared to do this, we shall not argue for the acceptance of 
our definition of the notion of a non-causally free inten­
tional action but Just go ahead and employ it.
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If this procedure strikes one as being too arbitrary, 
it may help to reflect that in the history of philosophy 
there is a long list of philosophers who have thought it 
sufficient to show that man is a free agent that his deci­
sions are uncaused. Indeed, the problem of non-causal free­
dom has traditionally been taken to be identical with the 
problem of non-causally free choice or decision. This, 
admittedly, does not justify our procedure in any final 
sense, but it does at least lend it a certain prima facie 
plausibility.
If within the confines of our definition of the no­
tion of a non-causally free action it is granted that we 
have shown there to be such actions, then we can talk 
meaningfully of a sense of moral obligation. This, in turn, 
is a necessary condition of our being able to make sense 
out of the concept of responsibility in its most basic appli­
cation where it depends upon having and acting from a sense 
of moral obligation. But all this raises a very difficult 
problem with which we shall now have to deal. The problem 
can be put in terms of a question. . Granted that we have 
shown intentional actions to be non-causally free, how can 
this possibly render the sense of moral obligation coherent 
if we have this sense of moral obligation even when we are
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not performing Intentional actions and are, therefore, not 
free? For, it will be argued, intentional actions are 
occurrences and, as such, they occur at intervals or, if 
you like spasmodically. As a result, the freedom that is 
supposed to characterize them must also occur at intervals 
or be spasmodic. On the other hand, however, the sense or 
consciousness of moral obligation is by its very nature 
something continuous. And for this reason it is hard to 
see how the former can allow us, as we have maintained that 
it does, to talk meaningfully of the latter. Indeed, it is, 
we shall be told, hard to see how the one can have anything 
to do with the other.
It hardly needs saying that we must resist the 
temptation to extricate ourselves from this difficulty by 
treating our consciousness of moral obligation as something 
spasmodic. For, although that would make the non-causal 
freedom of intentional action relevant to our consciousness 
of moral obligation, the price would be exceedingly high. 
More specifically, the price would be the denial that any 
sense can be attached to a dispositional form of respon­
sibility, the one that we have held to be the most basic.
And this follows from the fact that if we were only spas­
modically or at intervals conscious of moral obligation we 
could not be responsible persons who are by the very mean­
ing of that phrase continuously aware of it.
It is clear that we must reverse the process. In-
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stead of treating our consciousness of moral obligation as 
something spasmodic in the way that intentional actions are 
alleged to be, we must, if the freedom they imply is to 
mean anything, show that Intentional actions constitute a 
continuum in the way that our consciousness of the moral 
command and a fortiori consciousness itself does. But how 
are we to do this? On the surface it seems clear that 
intentional actions are occurrences and to argue otherwise 
would be absurd. On the other hand, I think that we can, 
once beneath the surface, talk sensibly of a continuum of 
intentional action. Nor do we have to go very far beneath 
the surface; for there is nothing queer in the suggestion 
that a man is continuously performing intentional actions.
It only seems queer because we have a strong tendency to 
Isolate a particular action or set of actions that happen, 
for one reason or another, to interest us and to blot out 
those actions that precede and follow upon it. And there 
is nothing the matter v/lth this procedure so long as we 
recognize the element of arbitrariness Involved in it.
This element of arbitrariness is, however, so 
obvious that it is easy to overlook it. It is easy, for 
example, to think that, because we usually sum up our day's 
activities in terms of a few specific things that we did, 
this constitutes an exhaustive list of our activities for 
that day. But this is no more than to fashion the objective
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reality after our own interests. For the truth of the 
matter is, as Hampshire puts it, that "Any man is contin­
uously and without interruption responding to situations 
with actions that are to a greater or lesser degree delib­
erate and t h o u g h t f u l . N o r  should this fact surprise any­
one, On the contrary, it would be surprising if it were 
otherwise since it would force us to renounce the ordinary 
model of consciousness as a continuum. For it is, I think, 
undeniable that before we can Justifiably attribute con­
sciousness at all to anyone he must, in normal circum­
stances, give some answer or be able to give some answer 
to the question, "What ere you doing?" even if all he is 
doing is getting ready to receive an assailant's next blow.
It is true that the agent may not always be right 
in the answer he gives; but if he has reason to think he 
might make a mistake in this regard, he can always resort 
to the notion of trying to overcome the possible disparity 
between what is being done at the time and the state of 
affairs that this doing will bring into existence. With 
this qualification in mind we can with approval quote 
Hampshire once again:
At any moment in any man's waking and conscious life there is always a set of possible true answers to the question - 'What is he doing now?' For human beings, to be conscious is to have active inten-
1. Han^shire, Stuart, Thought and Action, p.116.
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tlons. Within the set of possible true answers to this question there is a smaller set of answers which the person himself would give if he was asked what he was doing.%
It has been thought by many philosophers, especially 
those in sympathy with the classical empiricist tradition, 
that there is no significant relationship between conscious­
ness and one’s ability to say what one is doing. Conse­
quently, it has been thought possible to conceive of con­
scious human beings who perform no actions. Indeed, in the 
classical empiricist tradition the very notion of an action 
becomes problematic and in attempting to explain it it has 
usually been explained away. In any case, it seems clear 
that there would be no significant relationship between con­
sciousness and one's ability to say what one is doing only 
if we could sensibly treat consciousness as somehow being 
an end in itself. And this would have to be contrasted 
with treating it as a means to an end or as an instrument. 
Now, I can see no conclusive way of showing that conscious­
ness is not to be treated in this way. On the other 
hand, however, there seems to be no good reason for treat­
ing it in this way and we have tried to provide one rea­
son for not treating it in this way. For, if the attri­
bution of consciousness to anyone presupposes his being 
able to give some answer to the question, "What are 
you doing?*, then there is a good reason to suppose that
2. Hampshire, Stuart, p.I69.
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consciousness is an adjunct to and an instrument for action. 
And it is only because we are constantly performing inten­
tional actions that a continuous consciousness can be attri­
buted to us.
We can see, then that the freedom of intentional 
actions does serve to render our sense of moral obligation 
coherent. Nor should this have been surprising from the 
start. On the contrary, it would have been surprising even 
seriously to have entertained the possibility of its being 
otherwise; for, if our consciousness of moral obligation 
was incoherent, this could only be because the notion of 
moral obligation itself was incoherent. But this would to 
deprive us of our very title of moral agents. Now, there 
are, undoubtedly, some people who are willing to suffer 
such a deprivation: one has only to think of any number of 
social and physical scientists along with, I hope, a 
minority group.of philosophers wno are willing to deny any 
meaning to the notion of responsibility and suggest that we 
dispense with it altogether. And it certainly was an impli­
cation of our earlier remarks that such a procedure would= 
commit one to renouncing any attempt to render our con­
sciousness of moral obligation coherent. After all, if the 
notion of responsibility implied the notion of a conscious-
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ness whose content Is moral obligation, then the denial of 
the first notion will imply the denial of the second. We, 
for our part, however, would argue that nothing could be 
more pregnant with paradox than Just this denial.
But that is another matter. What we must do now is 
to distinguish our approach to the problem of freedom from 
another one with which it might be confused. That latter 
consists in inferring non-causal freedom from the fact that 
we are responsible being*possessed of a moral consciousness. 
Now, we have not followed the same procedure. On the con­
trary. although we accepted the fact at the beginning that 
we were responsible beings possessed of a moral conscious­
ness, we have tried to argue on independent grounds for the 
existence of a non-causal freedom. Thus, if the approach 
from which we have distinguished our own can be said to 
constitute the approach of the moral libertarian, then 
another name will have to be found for ours. On the other 
hand, if the approach of the moral libertarian is taken to 
consist in showing that causally free activity is inextri­
cably bound up with moral activity, then we can with full 
Justice lay claim to the title in question; for we have 
argued from the beginning that a responsible agent is con­
tinuously aware of the moral demand. As a result, whatever 
he does will be done against the background of his moral
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consciousness. And if as an agent he is aware of his free­
dom, as a moral agent he is aware of the essentially moral 
nature of this freedom.
The notion of a moral consciousness constituting a 
permanent background for our actions has troubled some 
people because it seems to exclude the possibility of mor­
ally neutral action. For, surely, it is argued, much of 
what we do is of no moral consequence and does not require 
any background provided by the moral consciousness. Nor, 
it is argued, does it do any good to appeal once again to 
the distinction between background and foreground awareness. 
After all, the objection is not, as it was when we originally 
appealed to this distinction, that we are converting man 
into a morally obsessed wretch. Rather, it is that, even 
when he has only a background awareness of moral obligation, 
this excludes the possibility of morally neutral actions.
I think, however, that the objection can be met by 
an appeal to another distinction, namely, that between what 
the moral consciousness demands and what it permits. That 
is to say, very often the moral agent finds himself in a 
position where his moral consciousness does not dictate 
what he is to do or refrain from doing. And in this limited 
sense what he does will be morally neutral. But it is a
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limited sense since even here he is under an obligation to 
gain the assurance of his moral consciousness that what he 
does or refrains from doing is indifferent to it, Maclagan, 
rightly I think, has interpreted this obligation as an in­
stance of the obligation to avoid wrong-doing. As he puts 
it, "if there is a duty to avoid wrong-doing there is cor­
respondingly a duty to satisfy ourselves so far as we cah 
that in pursuing a certain^course we shall not be doing 
wrong,
Our objector, moreover, is not entirely correct 
when he maintains that the distinction between background 
and foreground awareness has absolutely no relevance to the 
matter at hand. For the assurance that the agent receives 
from his moral consciousness is, generally speaking, an 
assurance that dwells in the background. Indeed, it is for 
this very reason that one is tempted to believe in the 
absolute moral neutrality of certain actions; since such an 
assurance of the moral consciousness rarely occupies the 
centre of our attention, we are inclined, in reflecting on 
the contents of consciousness, to overlook its existence 
altogether. But this, as I have tried to show, would be 
mistaken.
3. Maclagan, W.O., p. 99.
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